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ABSTRACT 
 
ESSAYS ON OPTIMAL MIX OF TAXES, SPATIALITY AND PERSISTENCE 
UNDER TAX EVASION 
BY 
MOHAMMAD YUNUS 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. James R. Alm 
Major Department: Economics 
 
 This dissertation analyzes the optimal mix of direct and indirect taxes in an 
economy with multiple tax collecting authorities when both the taxes are subject to 
evasion and to what extent the tax compliance behavior of individuals in the United 
States are persistent and spatially dependent. 
 Essay I derives and provides an intuitive interpretation of: (i) impact of the 
changes in the government instruments on tax evasion by firms, the expected prices they 
charge, and the expected tax rates they face; (ii) a generalized version of Ramsey rule for 
optimal commodity taxation which accounts for income tax evasion from either or both 
the tax authorities; (iii) generalized formulae for the optimal income tax rate for each of 
the tax authorities; and (iv) the tradeoff between optimal tax rates and audit probabilities 
for each of the tax authorities. It also re-examines controversies surrounding the uniform 
income taxes and the differentiated commodity taxes, and investigates how income tax 
evasion affects the progressivity of the income tax rates. It concludes that whether or not 
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tax evasion calls for reductions in the optimal income tax rates hinges on how tax evasion 
and the associated concealment costs vary across individual taxpayers. 
 Essay II introduces the twin issues of spatiality and persistence in the individual 
income tax evasion. While the issue of persistence arises through accumulated learning 
over time, spatiality arises for several reasons. Some these include the exchange of 
information between taxpayers; the social norm of tax compliance: an individual would 
comply if everybody in the society complies and vice versa; individuals faced with 
dynamic stochastic decision problems that pose immense computational challenges may 
simply look to others to infer satisfactory policies and interpersonal dependence works 
through learning by imitating rather than learning by doing. State-level annual per return 
evasion of individual income tax and related data were used to examine the above 
hypotheses and found supports for both of them in the individual income tax evasion in 
the United States. 
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ESSAY I: TAX EVASION AND OPTIMAL MIX OF TAXES 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Depending on the feasibility of choices, policymakers in both developed and 
developing economies face the challenging task of striking a delicate balance between the 
direct and indirect taxes in the face of differential tax compliance. Insofar as taxes cannot 
be collected without costs, different proposals for tax instruments and tax structures 
should be judged on the basis of their administrative advantages, differential compliance, 
equity, efficiency, adequacy, and induced concealment costs. The World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund usually prescribe that developing countries rely more on 
indirect taxation in some form of uniform commodity taxes, especially the value added 
taxes because indirect taxes are more difficult to evade. The justification for this 
prescription is that poorly developed institutional structures of the tax collecting agencies 
in these countries are not conducive to collecting direct taxes in the face of ubiquitous 
nature of tax noncompliance and venal tax officials. The critics of this prescription 
usually point at the regressive nature of indirect taxation and question the presumption 
that evasion of commodity taxes is innocuous. 
 The optimal taxation theory offers hardly any guidance to resolve this debate, for 
this literature is primarily concerned with characterizing the tax structure that minimizes 
inefficiencies when the tax base is observable at no costs while giving due cognizance to 
equity concerns. Feasibility constraints in tax collection had remained outside the usual 
purview of optimal taxation literature until tax evasion literature made inroads into public
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finance. How do differences in evasion characteristics of taxes affect the choice and 
design of optimal tax systems? Why do the direct and the indirect taxes coexist even in 
presence of tax evasion in most countries? If both the direct and the indirect taxes are to 
be collected, how should one strike a balance in designing an optimal mix? The existing 
literature does not provide much substantive ground to resolve these issues. 
 This essay is an exploration of the role of tax evasion in the design of tax systems. 
Our particular interest lies in how tax evasion affects the optimal mix of direct and 
indirect taxes in the presence of multiple tax collecting authorities. It attempts to build on 
Boadway, Marchand, and Pestieau (1994). These authors provide a justification for an 
optimal tax solution in a model with linear commodity taxes and non-linear income taxes 
when only the latter can be evaded at private costs. Despite offering an important insight 
into how evasion of both direct and indirect taxes affects the optimal tax structures, their 
work fails to account for some realistic features of actual tax systems. For instance, 
evaders in their model are never caught in their cheating. Thus, these are models of tax 
avoidance with differential compliance costs, and therefore lack a crucial feature of tax 
evasion—the uncertainty it introduces into the agents’ decision making due to the 
presence of random audits. This is of critical relevance scores of studies have shown that 
uncertainty brings significant changes to the fundamental rules suggested by certainty 
models of optimal taxation. Further, it is also unrealistic to assume that commodity taxes 
are not subject to evasion. 
 We consider a model with linear income and commodity taxes both of which can 
be evaded at private costs in a world with two tax collecting authorities. One may think 
of the two tax authorities as the federal and state revenue authorities as in the U.S. or tax 
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authorities at the national and local government levels in other countries. In practice, 
there may be more than two levels of tax authorities in some countries such as in the U.S. 
Thus, the assumption of two tax authorities would serve as a prototype of the real world 
complexities, especially for the large western capitalist economies. This is equally true 
for many developing economies with large territorial boundaries. The sheer size of these 
economies makes it hard for the tax administration to control everything from the center. 
Besides, with federal constitutional system allows the local governments in many of the 
developing countries to impose and collect taxes in their own jurisdictions apart from the 
taxes imposed by the federal government. 
 While firms pay commodity taxes to a single tax authority, income earners have 
to pay taxes to two different tax authorities. Our analysis shows how the standard results 
in the optimal taxation literature are affected by evasion of direct and/or indirect taxes by 
individuals and firms while accounting for the uncertainty arising from tax audits by at 
least one of the tax authorities and the costs associated to the concealment of true tax 
liability. By including the audit probabilities on both income and commodities in the set 
of feasible instruments, our model is one of optimal taxation and optimal enforcement of 
the tax laws. From this perspective, our model is closer to Slemrod (1994). With 
countries gradually heading towards uniform tax rates, the model provides a justification 
for the relevance of the analysis and a logically consistent framework to study important 
policy questions related to the optimal mix of taxes, the design of optimal tax structures, 
and the optimal enforcement of the tax base. 
 The optimal tax system in our model involves a mix of linear income taxes and 
differentiated commodity taxes. We derive and provide an intuitive interpretation of: (i) 
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the impact of the changes in the government instruments on tax evasion by firms, the 
expected prices they charge, and the expected tax rates they face; (ii) a generalized 
version of Ramsey rule for optimal commodity taxation which accounts for income tax 
evasion from either or both the tax authorities; (iii) generalized formulae for the optimal 
income tax rates for each of the tax authorities; and (iv) the tradeoff between optimal tax 
rates and audit probabilities for each of the tax authorities. We also re-examine 
controversies surrounding the uniform income taxes and the differentiated commodity 
taxes, and how income tax evasion affect the progressivity of the income tax rates. We 
conclude that whether or not tax evasion calls for reductions in the optimal income tax 
rates (and thus lower progressivity) hinges on how tax evasion and the associated 
concealment costs vary across individual taxpayers. 
 Section 2 provides a brief review of the literature on the optimal taxation and tax 
evasion. Section 3 develops a model and discusses the behaviors of firms and individuals 
together with some key comparative static results. Sections 4 and 5 restate the optimal tax 
problem, and derive and discuss the expressions that characterize the optimal commodity 
tax structure and the optimal income tax rates for the two tax authorities, compare them 
with their well-known analogues in standard optimal tax models, and discuss conditions 
under which the two coincide while highlighting the new features of our model. Section 6 
investigates the issue of the progressivity of the optimal income tax rates. Section 7 
characterizes the tradeoff between optimal commodity tax rates and audit probabilities 
and the optimal enforcement of income taxes. Finally, Section 8 concludes with a 
summary of results and the avenue of future research. 
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A BRIEF REVIEW OF TAX EVASION AND OPTIMAL TAXATION 
 
 The essay touches two strings of issues in public finance—optimal taxation and 
tax evasion. The optimal tax literature has been primarily concerned with characterizing 
the tax structure that minimizes the distortions that second best taxation entails to 
individual choices of work and consumption while achieving certain equity goals. 
Personal commodity consumption is not observable (or very costly to observe) in 
Ramsey’s (1927) optimal linear commodity tax problem. The tax authority observes 
aggregate demand or output of each commodity, and uses this observation as a screening 
device based on a priori information about the differences in consumption patterns 
between individuals with different ability. On efficiency grounds, the Ramsey rule 
suggests higher tax rates on commodities with lower elasticity of demand. But it does not 
specify the conditions that make uniform commodity tax rate optimal. In the optimal 
income taxation models following Mirrlees (1971), the tax authority observes income of 
the individuals but cannot observe their ability and/or labor supply independently. Taxes 
are then levied on income that is taken as a proxy for an individual’s productivity. A 
fundamental normative question of tax policy is then determining the optimal degree of 
income tax progressivity. 
 Following Ramsey (1927) and Mirrlees (1971), Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) 
show that tax structure does not involve a mix of taxes when preferences between 
consumption and leisure is weakly separable; a general income tax suffices to achieve the 
revenue and redistributive goals. When the only set of instruments available to the 
government are a linear income tax and linear commodity taxes, Deaton (1979, 1981) 
shows that uniform commodity taxation is optimal if preferences are separable between 
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goods and leisure and the Engel curves are linear. The linear income tax suffices, as 
commodity taxes do not serve any additional redistributive goal. Auerbach (1985), Stern 
(1987), and Stiglitz (1988) provide thorough surveys on the optimal taxation literature. 
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) give a comprehensive treatment of the subject. 
 The basic tenet of tax evasion models is that neither individual income nor 
consumption (nor sales of firms) are observable to tax authorities without costs. Tax 
assessments are largely based on taxpayers’ reports. Occasionally tax authorities conduct 
audits on taxpayers to determine their true tax liability. Since the availability of audits 
expands the tax authorities’ set of instruments, it brings forth new tradeoffs in the design 
of optimal tax policy. Further, the efficiency costs of the tax system are no longer limited 
to the usual distortions of individual labor supply and consumption choices. The costs of 
administering and enforcing the tax system and the compliance costs of taxpayers impose 
an additional deadweight loss to the society. These include audit costs, filing costs along 
with the costs incurred by taxpayers to conceal their true tax liability. As a result, tax 
authorities’ policies are no longer preoccupied with choosing the optimal tax base and 
structure of taxation as the same revenue objective can now be achieved through a 
combination of several policy instruments. 
 Allingham and Sandmo (1972), Kolm (1973), and Srinivasan (1973) are the 
seminal papers that first studied the tax evasion problem. These authors treat tax evasion 
as a problem of individual choice under uncertainty to which standard portfolio allocation 
theory could be applied. Sandmo (1981) and Kaplow (1990) were the first to look into the 
problem of optimal income and commodity taxation respectively. They derive modified 
rules for optimal income and commodity tax rates that account for tax evasion and 
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characterize the factors that determine the choice between higher taxation and tighter 
enforcement of tax laws. Cremer and Gahvari (1993) introduce tax evasion into the 
Ramsey commodity taxation problem and derive a modified version of Ramsey rule for 
optimal commodity taxes, characterize the tradeoff between optimal tax rates and audit 
probabilities and discuss how tax evasion and its concealment affect some standard 
results such as the optimality of uniform commodity taxes. With the exception of Sandmo 
(1981), the above works focus on a representative consumer economy and hence do not 
examine fully the issue of tax progressivity. Slemrod (1994) studies the impact of tax 
avoidance on optimal income tax progressivity in a linear income tax model with a costly 
tax enforcement mechanism, and concludes that increased tax enforcement is an 
alternative to higher tax rate for ensuring income tax progressivity. Cremer and Gahvari 
(1994) also focus on evasion in the linear tax problem but study the role of the income 
concealment technology, particularly how the possibility to influence the probability of 
being caught evading and the costs of concealment affect the progressivity of optimal 
linear income tax. Cremer and Gahvari (1996) study the effect of evasion and 
concealment costs in the optimum general income tax framework. Cowell (1990), 
Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein (1998), Alm (1999), and Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002) are 
classic surveys on tax evasion literature. 
 The above results on optimal taxation and tax evasion do not provide any 
satisfactory ground to justify the common coexistence of direct and indirect taxation. 
Boadway, Marchand, and Pestieau (1994) are the first to use differences in tax evasion as 
a rationale for justifying a mix of direct and indirect taxes as optimal. They consider the 
choice between a general income tax and linear commodity tax in a two-class economy 
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where taxes have different evasion characteristics, including concealment costs and show 
that, in general, the optimal tax solution involves a mix of taxes—a result in sharp 
contrast to Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976). Under the premise that indirect taxes are harder 
to evade, their model allows for evasion of only the direct taxes. 
 Boadway, Marchand, and Pestieau (1994) lack an enforcement mechanism to 
audit income reports—a crucial issue that comes with tax evasion as it introduces 
uncertainty into the agents’ decision making. This is of critical relevance since works by 
Weiss (1976), Eaton and Rosen (1980a, 1980b), Varian (1980), Stiglitz (1982), Hamilton 
(1987), and Cremer and Gahvari (1995) show that optimal taxation rules are substantially 
modified in the presence of uncertainty. Moreover, enforcement parameters in these 
studies are excluded from the set of feasible tax revenue instruments of the tax 
authorities. But Slemrod (1994) stresses that optimal tax problem should consider both 
the choice of tax rules and their enforcements. 
 Our model combines two linear income taxes and a linear commodity tax subject 
to evasion at private costs. We extend Cremer and Gahvari’s (1993) commodity tax 
evasion problem to an economy with risk averse firms and juxtapose two linear income 
taxes for two different tax authorities that are also subject to evasion. In contrast to 
Cremer and Gahvari (1994), we relax the assumption of quasi-linear preferences in 
analyzing the income taxes, and show that this is crucial to determining the extent to 
which tax evasion affects optimal tax rules. By expanding the set of feasible instruments 
to include audit probabilities, we investigate the tradeoffs that arise between tax rates and 
audit probabilities as an alternative means to raise tax revenues. Since the difficulties in 
observing personal consumption patterns and higher costs of administering and enforcing 
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a system of multiple taxes dictate a heavy reliance on a few tax rates, our model bears 
relevance to most real world tax systems. 
 
A MODEL OF TAX EVASION AND MIX OF TAXES 
 
 Consider a competitive economy with n industries each with “many” identical 
firms producing a homogenous commodity. Individuals have identical preferences over 
the set of n commodities and leisure but differ in their abilities. There are two tax 
authorities—A and B; tax authority A collects a fixed amount of revenue by imposing 
taxes on wage income while B collects revenue by imposing taxes on both wage income 
and commodity sales. 
 Like other tax evasion models none of the tax authorities observe true incomes of 
individuals or sales of firms (by tax authority B). Therefore, tax assessments are based on 
individuals’ income and firms’ sales reports. Tax authorities carry out costless cursory 
examinations that reveal tax-dodgers unless the latter spend resources to conceal incomes 
and output. Tax authorities also carry random independent audits of taxpayers that reveal 
true incomes and sales proceeds. 
 Tax authority B collects a fixed amount of revenue MB by choosing the n×1 
vector of commodity tax rates t , with [ ]1 ,0∈it and industry specific audit probabilities, 
σ , with ( )1 ,0∈iσ , the parameters of linear income tax function tB, the lump sum grant 
αB and the probability of randomly audited incomes σB. Similarly, tax authority A 
collects a fixed amount of revenue MA by choosing the parameters of linear income tax 
function tA, the lump sum grant αA and the probability of randomly audited incomes σA. 
Finally, there is a ‘super government’ that maximizes a strictly concave Bergson-
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Samuelson social welfare function that represents the social preferences for redistribution 
subject to the revenue constraints of the two tax authorities. 
 
Firm’s Sales Report 
 
 Firms in our model are characterized by constant returns to scale technology. The 
marginal cost of production, ci, in industry i is constant for all firms, but it differs across 
industries. Industry i sells its output, Xi, in a competitive market at price pi and is subject 
to a commodity tax rate it . Tax authority B assesses the due taxes of a typical firm in the 
industry based on its reported sales. A firm can evade taxes by reporting only a fraction 
10 ≤≤ iδ of its sales. The tax authority B carries out a cursory scrutiny of the firm’s 
report that reveals true sales proceeds unless the latter spends resources to conceal its 
unreported sales. Each firm incurs a cost of concealment ( )iiG δ−1  per unit of output zi. 
These costs are proportional to unreported output. Let us assume that ( )iiG δ−1  is strictly 
convex with ( ) 00' →iG  and ( ) ∞→1'iG . Define ( ) ( ) ( )iiiii Gg δδδ −−=− 111 . This implies 
that ( ) 00' →ig  and ( ) ∞→1'ig . 
 Firms in each industry face a probability, iσ , of audit that is independent of their 
sales reports. When caught cheating, firms have to pay the true taxes due plus a penalty 
(θ -1) proportional to the amount of taxes evaded. The penalty rate is assumed to be 
exogenous and equal in all industries. Firms take prices and enforcement parameters set 
by the tax authority B as given, and maximize expected profits by choosing output and 
the proportion of sales reported for tax assessments. Thus, firm i’s sales report is 
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iiiiNC tgpi δ−−=Γ if it is not caught cheating and ( )( ) iiiiiC ttgpi δθ −−−−−=Γ 11 if it is 
caught cheating. 
 We will derive the expected profit assuming that firms are risk-averse.1 The 
competitive assumption together with the constant marginal costs and proportional 
concealment costs imply that output will be determined endogenously in the case of risk-
averse firms. This assumption is at variance with Cremer and Gahvari (1993) who adopt 
separability due to assumption of risk neutrality. This separability no longer exists when 
firms are risk-averse as is typically the case for small-scale owner-managed businesses. 
Under these circumstances, the problem faced by firms in this economy can be analyzed 
by focusing on a representative firm. Hence, firm i in one of the industries solves: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )( ){ }[ ] iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii zczttgpztgpE −−−−−−+−−−= δθπσδπσπδ 111 maxi  (3.1) 
 
The assumptions of risk aversion of firms and the convexity of the concealment 
technology imply that the above expected profits function is strictly concave. Thus, the 
first and the second order conditions for this problem are: 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) 011 '''' =−+Γ+−Γ− iiiCiiiiiNCii ztgztg ii θπσπσ      (3.2) 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) 011 '''22'"'''22''' <⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ Γ−−+Γ+⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ Γ−−Γ− iiiCiiiiCiiiiNCiiiiNCii zgztgzgztg iii πθπσππσ (3.3) 
                                                 
1 It is a polemic issue if firms are risk-averse or risk neutral. To us risk aversion is a tenable assumption for 
the small-scale firms while risk neutrality assumption is necessary for firms with corporate environment. 
Although large firms with corporate culture individually pays more tax revenue to tax authority, tax 
payments of the small firms as a group far exceed their counterpart of the large firms. Thus modeling firms 
as risk averse comes closer to reality. Further, the relevant propositions, theorems etc. for risk neutral firms 
are special case of the risk neutral firms. 
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The first order condition can be rewritten as: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ]
( ) ( ) ( )
ii
i
CiiNCii
CiiiNCiii
ii
t
g Γ+Γ−
−Γ−Γ−=−′ ''
''
1
11
)1( πσπσ
θπσπσδ      (3.2′) 
 
Since by assumption 0)1( >−′ iig δ , a necessary condition for 0>iδ is that returns to 
evasion be positive or equivalently ( ) ( ) ( )( )11 '' −Γ>Γ− θπσπσ iCiiiNCii . Since we are 
interested in interior solution, we assume that this condition is satisfied. Note that the 
equivalent condition derived by Cremer and Gahvari (1993) is a special case of (3. 2′) 
under assumption of risk neutrality of firms. 
 Let us define 
 
( ){ }θσδδ iiiitt −+= 1ei          (3.4) 
 
to be the expected tax rate on the i-th commodity. Given a large number of firms the 
pricing condition in industry i then becomes: 
 
( ) eiiiii tgcp +−+= δ1         (3.5) 
 
where ( )iig δ−1 and eit are evaluated at *iδ that solves (3.2). Proposition 1 addresses how 
the equilibrium is affected if one of the tax rates or the audit probabilities changes: 
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Proposition 1: The effect of a change in the statutory tax rate would have an ambiguous 
impact on the sales reports and the effective tax rate but would have a positive effect on 
the prices charged by firms. The effect of a change in the probability of industry-specific 
audit would be positive on the sales reports, the effective tax rate, and the prices charged 
by firms. 
 
( ) ( )( )[ ] ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )[ ]
0
111111 ''''''''
<
>−−−−+−+Γ++−Γ−=∂
∂
D
zztgzztg
t
iiiiiiCiiiiiiiiNCii
i
i θπδθθπσπδπσδ (3.6) 
( ) 01)1( <
>−∂
∂+−+=∂
∂ θσδθσδδ i
i
i
iiii
i
e
i
t
t
t
t       (3.7) 
0)1(' <
>−+∂
∂−=∂
∂ θσδδ ii
i
i
i
i
i
t
g
t
p        (3.8) 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
0
11 '''' >−+Γ−−Γ−=∂
∂
D
tgtg iiCiiiiNCii
i
i ii θπσπσ
σ
δ     (3.9) 
( ) 01)1( >⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −∂
∂+−=∂
∂ θσσ
δθδσ ii
i
ii
i
e
i tt        (3.10) 
0)1( >−=∂
∂ θσδσ iiii
i tp         (3.11) 
 
where D  is negative as defined in (3.3). 
Proof: Differentiate (3.2), (3.4) and (3.5) with respect to the instruments at the disposal of 
the tax authority B.   
 It is not surprising that most of the results of Cremer and Gahvari (1993) can be 
derived from the above conditions when risk neutrality of firm is invoked. Condition 
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(3.6) implies that an increase in the statutory commodity tax rate would induce an 
increase or decrease in tax evasion depending upon the degree of absolute risk aversion. 
This result is at variance with Cremer and Gahvari (1993) who report a positive 
relationship between statutory tax rate and evasion in the case of  risk-neutral firms. 
When firms are risk-averse their proposition no longer holds since both the income and 
substitution effects are now at work. However, condition (3.7) shows that the impact of a 
change in the statutory tax rate transcends from the evasion decision to the effective tax 
rate and hence the effect is ambiguous. Since we assume constant cost industry, 
conditions (3.8) and (3.11) are not unexpected. Anything that increases the cost per unit 
would also increase price proportionately. 
 Condition (3.9) implies that a higher industry-specific audit probability would 
lead to higher tax compliance. This implies that higher audit probability would increase 
industry-specific effective tax rate. These results are expected since higher audit rate 
would have a salutary effect in protecting both the tax base and the statutory tax rate. 
These results simply reflect the natural responses of a risk-averse firm to policies that 
affect the expected return to tax evasion. 
 
Lemma 1: Changes in tk and σk do not affect the values of pi and δi. 
 
ki       0 ≠∀=∂
∂=∂
∂=∂
∂=∂
∂
k
i
k
i
k
i
k
i p
t
p
t σσ
δδ      (3.12) 
 
Proof: It follows from industry-specific tax rate and audit probability assumptions.   
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Individual’s Problem 
 
 
 Consider a continuum of individuals with different abilities distributed according 
to a continuous distribution function F(w) with support on [wl, wh] – a closed interval on 
R+. Each individual is endowed with 1 unit of time to allocate between leisure and 
labor l . The value of w gives the relative efficiency of labor supplied per unit of time. 
Given the assumption of linearly homogeneous technology, this represents the marginal 
productivity of labor for a worker of ability w. The total productivity of a worker will 
then be equal to her wage income y ≡ w l . Let nnX +ℜ⊂  be the commodity space and x 
≡{ } niiix ==1 be a vector of commodities. Individuals have identical preferences over Xn and 
leisure 1- l  represented by a well-behaved utility function U(x, 1- l ). 
 Individuals face linear income tax systems from tax authorities A and B with 
constant marginal tax rates tA and tB and receive uniform lump sum transfers αA and αB 
respectively from them as guaranteed income. They evade taxes by reporting proportions 
δA and δB of their pre-tax wage income y. Tax authorities assess due taxes based on 
reported incomes while carrying out cursory examinations that reveal cheating unless the 
taxpayer spends resources to conceal true income. Concealment costs per $1 are given 
by ( )BABAiK δδδδ +−−1 . These costs are assumed to be proportional to undeclared 
income and 10 ≤≤ Aδ also 10 ≤≤ Bδ . Let us assume that K(.) is strictly a quasi-convex 
function with ( ) ( ) 000 ' →= ii KK and ∞→′ )1(iK . Let us also assume as a simple case that 
( ) ( ) ( )BABAiBABABABAi Kk δδδδδδδδδδδδ +−−+−−=+−− 111 . Then the above 
restrictions on ( )BABAiK δδδδ +−−1 imply that ( ) ( ) 000 ' →= ii kk  and ∞→′ )1(ik . 
Individuals face random audits with probabilities σA and σB from tax authorities A and B, 
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which are independent of the declared incomes to the tax authorities. Audit by a tax 
authority would reveal the true income to that tax authority only. Once evasion is 
established, individuals have to pay exogenous fines (θA – 1) and (θB – 1) proportional to 
evaded taxes in addition to their true tax liabilities following the amendments Yitzhaki 
(1974) made to the Allingham-Sandmo (1972) model. 
 An individual might find herself in four different possible states depending on 
whether she is audited by tax authority A or B, or by both, or not audited at all. Assume 
that she makes her labor supply and income report decisions at the beginning of the 
reference period, prior to knowledge of audit lotteries. These decisions determine her 
wage income net of concealment costs. Depending on the outcome of the audit lotteries 
her post-tax wage rate in four possible contingencies becomes: 
 
{ }
{ }
{ }
{ } ⎪⎪⎭
⎪⎪⎬
⎫
+−−−−−=
−−−+−−−−−=
−−−+−−−−−=
−−−−−−+−−−−−=
)1(1
)1)(1()1(1
)1)(1()1(1
  )1)(1()1)(1()1(1
4
3
2
1
BABABBAA
BBBBABABAA
AAABABABBA
BBBAAABBABABA
kttww
tkttww
tkttww
ttkttww
δδδδδδ
δθδδδδδ
δθδδδδδ
δθδθδδδδ
 (3.12) 
 
with the associated probabilities of occurrence as: 
 
( )
( )
( )( )⎪⎪⎭
⎪⎪⎬
⎫
−−=
−=
−=
=
BA
AB
BA
BA
S
S
S
S
σσ
σσ
σσ
σσ
11
1
  1
4
3
2
1
         (3.13) 
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Hence, the expected net return to her labor supply becomes j
j
j wS∑=
4
1
. At the end of the 
period, her post-audit tax treatment determines her after-tax income yj ≡ ljw available to 
allocate over consumption of the n commodities in the state. No savings are allowed. 
Hence, she has to devise a contingent consumption plan that meets the virtual budget 
constraint in all four states. Let p = (p1, p2, …, pn) be the vector of consumer prices. The 
virtual budget constraint for the individual can then be written as: 
 
jjj xpwy =+= αl ; j = 1, 2,…, 4 and α ≡ αA + αB     (3.14) 
 
Assume that the individual maximizes the expected utility. That means she takes the 
vector of prices p, the income tax parameters (tA, tB, αA, and αB), and chooses the state 
contingent vector of commodities xj, labor supplyl and the proportions of income to 
report (δA and δB) to solve: 
 
( )∑
=
−=Ψ
4
1
1,  
j
jjj xUSMax l   s.t. (3.14)     (3.15) 
 
whereΨ is assumed to be a twice continuously differentiable and well-behaved function. 
She simultaneously chooses her labor supply, and allocates the resulting pre-tax labor 
income to a lottery with sure return (true tax liability report) and a random return (income 
concealed from either tax authority or both) at a cost that is increasing and proportional to 
the share of the risky asset on her portfolio. She buys off the opportunity to affect her 
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effective income tax rates through her choice of the proportions of income reported. As a 
result, both the ex-ante and ex-post effective marginal tax rates to tax authorities A and B 
are no longer constant across individuals. Since uncertainty is not resolved until the end 
of the period, when the individual learns whether she is audited or not by the tax 
authorities A or B, her choice of consumption bundle becomes state contingent. Of 
course, when choosing δA δB and l , the individual has to take into account her optimal 
choice of xj. The Lagrangian and the associated first order conditions for this problem are 
given in Appendix A. 
 The first order conditions for xj and δm (m = A, B) can be used to derive necessary 
conditions for interior solutions for δm. Rewriting (A.7) and (A.8) in Appendix A gives: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ]
∑
=
+−−+=+−−′ 4
1
2143 11
j
j
AA
BABAA
tk
λ
λλθλλδδδδ      (3.16) 
( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ]
∑
=
+−−+=+−−′ 4
1
3142 11
j
j
BB
BABAB
tk
λ
λλθλλδδδδ      (3.17) 
 
Since ( )BABAmk δδδδ +−−′ 1 > 0 in an interior solution, (3.16) and (3.17) imply: 
 
( )
( ) ( )1
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21
43
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43 −>′+′
′+′≡+
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xx
xx
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USUS
USUS θλλ
λλ       (3.18) 
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( ) ( )1
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i.e., the marginal rate of substitution of consumption of each commodity between “good” 
and “bad” states must be greater than the penalties for income tax evasion imposed by the 
respective tax authorities. Thus, she would evade taxes from either of the tax authorities 
as long as the above inequalities hold. The strict concavity of utility function U is both a 
necessary and a sufficient condition to guarantee that the solutions for δm are indeed 
global maximum. 
 
Income Tax Evasion and Optimal Decision Rules 
 
 Note that the individual’s optimal choice involves substitution across three 
margins: (i) for a given after-tax income from the tax authorities, the composition of her 
consumption bundle on each state of nature; (ii) the usual, now disaggregated, leisure-
consumption tradeoff; and (iii) the tradeoff between the benefits of evasion through 
enhanced consumption possibilities and its concomitant costs (risky consumption and 
concealment costs). Given the general specification of consumer preferences, these 
tradeoffs are intertwined in a non-trivial way. For instance, optimal labor supply will, in 
general, depend on the choice of income reports and the resulting concealment costs since 
these affect the net return to work. Similarly, tax evasion behavior will, in general, be 
influenced by commodity prices and non-wage income. 
 In order to characterize these tradeoffs, the first order conditions (A.2) through 
(A.8) in Appendix A can be combined and simplified to get: 
 
( )
( ) kijx
jx
p
p
xU
xU
kj
ij =−′
−′
l
l
1,
1,
;    j = 1, 2, 3, 4;   i = 1, 2, …, n and i ≠ k   (3.20) 
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jj
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   (3.23) 
 
Condition (3.20) implies that, conditional on an audit state, the structure of the optimal 
consumption bundle is determined by equating the marginal rate of substitution between 
two commodities and their respective price ratio. Thus, if the consumer knew the 
outcome of audit lotteries before they are resolved, the substitution at the margin between 
any two commodities would be governed by their market terms of trade. With the 
uncertainty arising from tax evasion, the optimal consumption bundle will also be 
affected by the terms of trading risks across audit states. 
 Conditions (3.21) and (3.22) which characterize optimal income tax evasion 
implicitly, illustrate this result from the optimal choices of δA and δB. While the right 
hand sides of these conditions show the rate of substitution between good and bad states, 
the left hand sides are the slopes of the respective boundary of the budget set defined by 
all feasible pairs ( ) ( ){ } ( ) ( ){ }[ ]31422143 ,,, and  ,,, iiiiiiii xxxxxxxx given the individual’s 
labor supply and the tax enforcement parameters of the tax authorities A and B. These 
slopes are given by the ratios of net marginal benefits of tax evasion from tax authorities 
A and B in each possible state. Thus, conditions (3.21) and (3.22) imply that the 
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willingness to transfer consumption of any commodity from the ‘good’ to the ‘bad’ state 
must be equal to the implicit “relative price” of trading risk (income concealment from 
either tax authority) and no risk (income reported truly to both the tax authorities). 
 Finally, condition (3.23) describes the modified optimal tradeoff between leisure 
and consumption of any commodity. The ratio of the marginal utilities to leisure for 
consumption of each commodity must equal the post-tax relative wage after concealment 
costs are taken into account. With no evasion of taxes owed to tax authorities A and B, 
(3.23) gives the usual optimality condition. With income tax evasion, the tradeoff is 
affected by the marginal tax rates, the choices of δA and δB, and the concealment 
technology, all of which affect the return to labor supply. With δA and δB at their optimal 
levels, a higher per capita cost, ( )BABAik δδδδ +−−1 , reduces the net return to work effort. 
In contrast, higher income concealment (i.e., lower values of δA and δB) reduces the 
expected income tax rates and thus increases the return to labor supply. It is, thus, clear 
that labor-leisure tradeoff critically hinges on the tax evasion decisions of the individual. 
 Given the general specification of individual preferences in our model, the 
interdependence among tax evasion from the tax authorities, consumption and labor 
supply determines δA and δB, which, in turn, determine how much consumption is put at 
stake in audit lotteries. The choice of state contingent consumption bundle provides 
numerous ways to diversify the risks of tax evasion over the n commodities. Differences 
in income elasticity both across commodities and individual types intertwine the realized 
consumption pattern to the tax evasion behavior. Existing complementarities between 
consumption and leisure interlock an individual’s labor supply and tax evasion decisions. 
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  In order to illustrate these issues, consider the case of quasi-linear preferences in 
consumption and leisure, so that individuals are risk neutral and income effects of audits 
are immaterial. In that case (3.21) and (3.22) reduce to: 
 
( )[ ]AAA SStk θ211 +−=′       (3.21′) 
( )[ ]BBB SStk θ311 +−=′       (3.22′) 
 
These conditions imply that δA (δB) equates the marginal cost of income concealment 
from tax authority A (B) to income tax evasion. Note that both of the evasion decisions 
are independent of lump sum grants, pre-tax wage rate, and prices, and hence commodity 
tax parameters. Since per capita concealment costs ( ).iK  are assumed to be the same for 
all individual types, everyone evades same fraction of their income and hence faces the 
same effective tax rates: 
 
( )( )[ ]AAAAeA SStt δθδ −++= 121       (3.24) 
( )( )[ ]BBBBeB SStt δθδ −++= 131       (3.25) 
 
Substituting (3.21′) and (3.22′) into (3.23) and simplifying yields: 
 
( ) [ ]ktt
q
wU eB
e
A
i
−−−=−′− 11 ll       (3.26) 
where eAt and
e
Bt are evaluated at the optimal values of δA and δB. This condition implies 
that the optimal labor supply is determined by equating the marginal utility of leisure to 
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the net expected return to work effort. Since the partial derivatives of (3.26) with respect 
to δA and δB result in (3.21′) and (3.22′), labor supply is independent of tax evasion 
decisions, conditional on the optimal values of δA and δB. 
 Note that (3.21′) and (3.22′) imply that income tax evasion will unambiguously 
increase with a higher marginal income tax rate and/or a lower probability of audit by 
either or both the tax authorities. These results are the two tax authority generalization of 
Cremer and Gahvari (1994) and Boadway, Marchand, and Pestieau (1994). However, 
these results and that δA and δB are constant across individuals dependent crucially on the 
assumption of risk aversion and are yet to be supported by empirical evidence. In general, 
the optimal values of δA and δB differ from the ones derived through benefit-cost 
analysis, and are affected by income effects arising from changes in lump sum transfers, 
commodity tax rate, income tax rates, and audit probabilities. Since the intensities of 
these income effects will vary along the distribution of abilities, the propensities to evade 
taxes will vary across individuals and hence will affect their consumption-leisure tradeoff 
in a non-trivial way. As will be detailed later, such income effects along with the 
uncertainties arising from tax evasion play a crucial role in shaping the impact of tax 
evasion on optimal tax structures. 
 
Compensated Demands, Labor Supply, and Comparative Statics  
 
 Conditional on the exogenous penalty rates, the first order conditions (A.2) 
through (A.12) in Appendix A can be used to derive the corresponding commodity 
demand functions xij, labor supply l and the optimal proportions of income reported, δA 
and δB, for an individual as: 
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( )BABABABAij ttpwx σσααθθ ,,,,,,,,, ; i = 1, 2,…, n; j = 1, 2,…, 4.           (3.27) – (3.30) 
( )BABABABA ttpw σσααθθ ,,,,,,,,,l       (3.31) 
( )BABABABAA ttpw σσααθθδ ,,,,,,,,,       (3.32) 
( )BABABABAB ttpw σσααθθδ ,,,,,,,,,       (3.33) 
 
Note that while xi’s are random variables before the realization of income tax audit 
lotteries,l , δA and δB are not. Commodity tax evasion parameters affect these optimal 
choices through their affect on market prices. To characterize the response of individual 
to changes in the policy parameters of the two tax authorities, obtain the indirect utility 
function by substituting the vector of commodity demands and labor supply functions 
into (3.15) as: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ).1,.,,,,,,,,, 4
1
l−= ∑
=
j
j
jjBABABABA xUSttpwV σσααθθ    (3.15′) 
 
Given the optimal choices, the following envelope results can be derived by partially 
differentiating the above indirect utility function: 
 
[ ] 04
1
<−≡−= ∑
=j
kjjkjjp xxEV k λλ ;     k = 1, 2, 3 ,…, n.      (3.34) 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) 0112143 <
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
−−+++−≡⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
∂
∂−=
≡
444444 344444 21l
At
A AAAj
A
j
t wt
y
EV
λ
δθλλδλλλ    (3.35) 
 
 
 
25 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) 0113142 <
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
−−+++−≡⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
∂
∂−=
≡
444444 344444 21l
Bt
B BBBj
B
j
t wt
y
EV
λ
δθλλδλλλ    (3.36) 
( ) [ ] 04
1
>≡=≡= ∑
=j
jjEVVV BA λλααα       (3.37) 
( ) ( )( ) 0.1,.4
1
<−∂
∂= ∑
=j
jj
m
j xU
S
V
m
lσσ  ; m = A, B   (3.38) 
 
where
At
λ (
Bt
λ ) denotes the change in the expected marginal utility of income due to a 
change in the statutory income tax rate by tax authority A (B), ( )
BA
VVV ααα ≡=  is the 
expected utility of certain income, and 
m
Vσ shows the change in the expected marginal 
utility of income due a change in the probability of detection by the tax authorities. As 
expected, an increase in the price of the k-th good (for instance, through a higher 
commodity tax and/or audit probability), or an increase in the income tax rates and 
penalty rates by tax authorities A and/or B, all reduces the expected utility. However, the 
impact of audit probability is ambiguous in view of the fact that higher audit probability 
by one tax authority can be more than compensated for by the lower audit probability by 
the other tax authority. Since with tax evasion income and thus consumption are random 
variables, these expressions are just analogous to the usual expressions obtained in the 
absence of uncertainty, and readily highlight the difference made by the uncertainty that 
ensues with audit lotteries. 
 Let us derive the compensated demand and labor supply functions. Given the fact 
that the choice of income reports to tax authorities A and B are not the direct sources of 
utility, we may consider the tax compensated dual problem. Since the lump sum income 
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(the sum of grants α = αA+ αA) is the same regardless of the outcome of audit lotteries, 
the dual problem becomes: 
 
jjj wSx l−= p minα                 s.t.           ( ) *4
1
1, VxUS
j
jjj ≥−∑
=
l    (3.39) 
 
Although this problem differs from the usual one in duality theory with certainty, it has 
an almost similar intuitive interpretation. The optimal solution consists of the 
corresponding state contingent commodity bundles, labor supply, and the proportions of 
income reported to tax authorities A and B, so that the compensation required to provide 
the individual with the level of utility V* be minimum. Since the individual commits to a 
level of labor supply and proportions of income reports to tax authorities A and B before 
the realizations of audit lotteries, it is easier to think of the solution in two stages. In the 
first stage, for a fixed vector of xj, one chooses δA, δB and l based on the expected return 
to labor supply wj and these determine the pre-tax labor income net of concealment costs. 
In the second stage, given the optimal choices of δA, δB and l , the individual chooses the 
consumption vector, xj, to minimize α. The associated Lagrangian and the first order 
conditions are presented in Appendix B. 
 Not surprisingly, holding utility constant the individual behaves as a risk neutral 
agent. Hence, the optimal income reports are determined qualitatively the same way as in 
the absence of income effects (i.e., (3.21′) and (3.22′) for quasi-linear preferences). 
Therefore, cAδ and cBδ  are independent of w and consumer prices. Solving the system of 
equations (B.2) through (B.9) in Appendix B yields the compensated demand 
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functions, cijx , labor supply function, cl , income reports,
c
Aδ and cBδ , and the expenditure 
function, ( )*,,,,,,,, Vttpw BABABA σσθθα . We can then define the following 
equivalences using the fact that the lump sum grant α≡αA+αB is just sufficient to attain 
the specified level of indirect utility: 
 
( )( ) ( )*,,,,,,,,.,,,,,,,, Vttpwxttpwx BABABAcijBABABAij σσθθασσθθ ≡   (3.40) 
( )( ) ( )*,,,,,,,,.,,,,,,,, Vttpwttpw BABABAcBABABA σσθθασσθθ ll ≡   (3.41) 
( )( ) ( )*,,,,,,.,,,,,,,, Vttttpw BABABAcABABABAA σσθθδασσθθδ ≡    (3.42) 
( )( ) ( )*,,,,,,.,,,,,,,, Vttttpw BABABAcBBABABAB σσθθδασσθθδ ≡    (3.43) 
 
By the usual duality properties, we can then find the derivatives of the expenditure 
function as the marginal rate of substitution of the indirect utility function. Hence, from 
(3.34) through (3.38) one can derive: 
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Expressions (3.44) through (3.47) show the required change in the lump sum transfers 
needed to compensate an individual due to marginal changes in tax instruments by the 
two tax authorities so that she can still attain the level of utility V*. 
 
Proposition 2:  The optimal responses of an individual of a particular type to changes in 
the tax authorities’ parameters that affect prices, the return to labor supply, and income 
tax evasion are ambiguous. 
 
Proof: See Appendix C.   
 As expected, unless further restrictions on preferences are imposed, it is not 
possible to determine the sign of these expressions due to conflicting income and 
substitution effects. Insofar as the individual can substitute across several margins such 
as, across commodities, risk vis-à-vis no risk, and labor/leisure, in response to the 
policies by either tax authority A and B or both, the expected utility maximization is 
consistent with a variety of individual behavior. However, it may be noted that if the 
proportion of declared income decreases with lump sum grant, a tighter enforcement of 
the income tax laws by both the tax authorities (i.e., higher σA and/or σB), or a policy by 
tax authority B that increases consumer prices (i.e., higher it and/or iσ ) will induce 
taxpayers to unambiguously report higher proportions of their true income to both the tax 
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authorities. This follows from the fact that 
m
c
A
σ
δ
∂
∂ >0 and 
m
c
B
σ
δ
∂
∂ >0 (from differentiation of 
(B.8) and (B.9) respectively) and that an increase in the price of any goods affects 
evasion behaviors purely through an income effect that makes the individual relatively 
poorer. In general, the signs of (C.1) through (C.16) crucially hinge on the nature of 
relationship between goods, between goods and leisure, and the degree of absolute and 
relative risk aversion of the individual. 
 
THE OPTIMAL LEVEL OF TAXES TO THE TAX AUTHORITIES 
 
 Multi-agency tax evasion adds new ingredients to the standard optimal taxation 
problem of balancing equity and efficiency. In such a case the efficiency costs of the tax 
system will not be limited to the usual excess burden of taxation. Since incomes of 
individuals and sales of firms cannot be observed without costs by tax authority B, 
concealment and audit costs impose an additional deadweight loss to the society. Similar 
inefficiency also arises as a result of tax authority A’s inability to observe incomes of the 
individuals without additional costs. Further, lack of coordination between the tax 
authorities may increase the inefficiency costs that can actually be avoided. The more 
acute the tax evasion by individuals and firms, the more the tax authorities may have to 
divert to the enforcement of the tax laws. In addition, the efficiency costs in commodity 
taxation, in terms of the distortion in the relative prices, will now depend on the evasion 
behavior of firms across industries, through the differences in the technology affecting 
the concealment costs. Further, multi-agency tax evasion is likely to limit the 
redistributive role of the tax system since audit costs and costs that may arise due to lack 
of coordination reduce the levels of transfers to individuals and thus hamper 
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redistribution. Differential commodity taxation to favor the poor needs to be balanced 
against the above mentioned price distortions caused by commodity taxation. Insofar as 
different taxes have different evasion characteristics, the equivalence between the 
observed individual incomes and consumption or even between aggregate reported 
incomes and observed aggregate commodity consumption, no longer holds. Observed 
individual incomes and reported sales of firms, which now constitute the total tax base, 
are less reliable measures of individual welfare. 
 New tradeoffs emerge in the design of optimal tax policy for tax authority B. Due 
to the uncertainty that comes with tax audits, the choice of taxes becomes an issue of the 
extent to which revenue collection should rely more heavily on commodity taxes 
collected from firms or on income tax collected from individuals. There may now be 
additional social welfare gains from reducing the risk of tax evasion. Moreover, tax 
policies to both tax authorities A and B are no longer exclusively concerned with 
choosing optimal tax bases and the structures of taxation; as the set of instruments now 
include audit probabilities, tighter enforcement or a combination of tighter enforcement 
and higher tax rates or increased coordination between tax authorities A and B appears as 
an alternative. Welfare gains might be obtained by targeting certain goals with particular 
instruments so that the optimal policy may more likely involve a mix of taxes. 
 Under this backdrop let us now analyze the problems encountered by tax 
authorities A and B. In doing so, we make the assumption that the penalty rates, (θA-1), 
(θB-1) and (θ-1), on firms and individuals cannot be set to eradicate tax evasion fully. 
The costs of audits are given by functions ( )BAAc σσ , and ( )BABc σσ , for the individuals 
and ( )σc for the firms. While function c is strictly quasi-convex in all of its arguments, 
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function cB is strictly increasing in σB and non-increasing in σA. Similarly, function cA is 
strictly increasing in σA and non-increasing in σB. Further, we also assume that 
 
 cA(0) = cB(0) = c(0) = 0; 
( ) ( ) ∞→⎟⎟⎠
⎞
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∂
∂=∂
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σσ as σA(=σB) approaches unity. 
 
In this setting, et , eAt  and 
e
Bt  are of primary interest in the computation of tax revenues 
accrued to tax authorities A and B. Owing to a continuum of individuals, the realized 
means of the random variables are assumed to be equal to their expected values so that S1 
is the fraction of individuals actually caught cheating by both the tax authorities, S2 and 
S3 are the fractions of individuals caught cheating only by tax authority A and B 
respectively, and S4 is the fraction of individuals never caught by either of the tax 
authorities. Similarly, iσ is the fraction of firms in industry i caught cheating by the tax 
authority B. We can then define: 
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( ) BeBn
i
i
e
iBABABABAB wtxtttpwRR ασσσααθθθτ −+== ∑
=
l
1
,,,,,,,,,,,,   (4.4) 
 
where RA is the expected taxes net of transfers collected from an individual by tax 
authorities A, and RB is the expected taxes net of transfers collected from an individual 
and firm by tax authority B. Note that xij and l are given by the optimizing individual 
demand and labor supply functions defined earlier and that tax collections depend on the 
tax evasion behaviors of individuals and firms and the respective effective tax rates. The 
‘super government’ chooses to maximize a strictly quasi-concave (indirect) social welfare 
function ( )( )BABABABA ttpwVH σσααθθ ,,,,,,,,,  subject to the respective revenue 
constraints for the tax authorities. Assuming the per capita revenue requirements for tax 
authorities A and B, the problem of the ‘super government’ can be stated as: 
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h
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=−−∫ σσσσσσααθθθ ,,,,,,,,,,,,,  (4.7) 
 
The Lagrangian and the associated first order conditions are presented in Appendix D. 
Combining (3.37), (D.3) and (D.4), one can derive the expressions for the Lagrangian 
multipliers of tax authority A’s and B’s revenue constraints as: 
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These can be interpreted as the average social marginal utilities of certain income using 
the revenues of tax authorities A and B as numeraire. As 0<⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
∂
∂∫ ww
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l α , if we assume that the product of own effects dominates that of cross 
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j dF
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l α ; ji ≠ , then γA and γB are both positive as required for an 
interior solution. We assume that theses conditions are satisfied. As a result, the first 
order conditions imply that: 
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That is, in an interior optimum there should be positive net marginal revenue from 
increasing tA and σA by tax authority A and by increasing tk, tB, σB, and σk by tax 
authority B. Further, tax authorities can jointly minimize their income tax audit costs 
through coordination of their audit information. Otherwise, since the instruments are 
distortionary, aggregate welfare could be increased by simply setting the instruments to 
zero by either or both the tax authorities so as to eliminate distortion. 
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These expressions and the first order conditions in (D.1) through (D.10) can be used to 
characterize the level and structure of optimal taxes and audit probabilities in our 
prototype economy. Since the model is non-linear the closed form solution for these key 
parameters cannot be derived at this level of generalization. To what extent these 
restrictions are satisfied has to be verified empirically based on data from the real world. 
Nevertheless, our analytical approach is useful in illustrating the main qualitative 
relationships within a logically consistent framework. 
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OPTIMAL TAX RULES UNDER TAX EVASION 
 
 Insofar as both the direct and the indirect taxes can be evaded and there are tax 
authorities to enforce their tax rules, optimality involves both types of taxes to both the 
tax authorities. So, we will derive expressions for optimal commodity and income taxes, 
and compare them with the expressions derived for optimal commodity taxation by 
Ramsey (1927) and optimal income tax rate derived by Dixit and Sandmo (1977). 
 
Optimal Commodity Tax Rates 
 
 For the purpose of optimal commodity taxation, let us treat σ, tA, tB, σA, and σB as 
fixed and substitute (3.34), (C.1) through (C.4),  (4.10), and (4.18) into (D.7) to get: 
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where
B
A
γ
γγ = , the ratio of the marginal utilities of income to tax authorities A and B 
modifies the usual Ramsey rule. The modified rule now takes into account not only the 
type of commodities but also who are the main consumers of these goods. Further, the 
modified rule clearly takes into consideration both the equity and efficiency aspects of 
optimal taxation. In our setting the efficiency aspect includes the change in the expected 
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tax resulting from the income effect of the lump sum transfer on income reported to the 
tax authorities. Given the concavity of H and U, wb tends to be biased in favor of the low 
income individuals. 
 
Proposition 3: In an economy with linear income and commodity taxes that are subject to 
random audits by multiple tax authorities, optimal commodity tax rates satisfy the 
following relationship, nk ,...,2,1=∀ : 
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Proof: Use (4.13) and (4.22), the symmetry of the matrix of compensated demand 
functions and divide (5.1) by Xk   
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in the above modified Ramsey 
rule can be termed as the net social marginal utility of certain income after taking into 
account the net effect of transfers from tax authorities A and B on the expected taxes 
collected from an individual. Note that wb is analogous to γh in Diamond (1975), which 
plays an important role in the optimal taxation literature. It captures the weight of 
individual’s ability in the social welfare function depending on how aggregate welfare 
and the tax payment by the individual change with the lump sum transfer. 
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 The left hand side of (5.2) gives the percentage reduction in the compensated 
demand for commodity xk caused by the change in the tax rate on it and is usually 
referred to as “index of discouragement” à la Mirrlees (1976). The first term in the right 
hand side measures the extent to which taxes are levied on goods that are consumed by 
individuals with a high or low net social marginal utility of income i.e., the rich or the 
poor. Recall that expression (3.44) gives the change in the lump sum transfer that is 
required to compensate an individual for a price change induced by the change in the 
statutory tax rates. With no income tax evasion from either tax authority, this is just xkj. 
This compensation varies in accordance with the differences in consumption patterns. For 
instance, low-income individuals should be compensated more when necessities are taxed 
heavily. The more the k-th commodity is consumed by individuals with a high social 
marginal utility of income or income elastic tax payments (i.e., high income elasticity 
estimates for goods or low income elasticity estimates of labor supply and tax evasion), 
the smaller the reduction in the compensated demand for xk, and the lower tends to be its 
expected tax rate. Insofar as this correlation is expected to become pronounced for 
necessities, (5.2) suggests that the commodities consumed by the poor should be subject 
to a lower expected tax rate. 
 The second term reflects the marginal income tax revenue accrued to tax 
authorities A and B due to the substitution effect on labor supply of a change in tk. With 
no income tax evasion, such as in the usual Ramsey formula, this term is usually 
subsumed in the left hand side summation. Given that commodity taxes and income taxes 
levied by tax authorities A and B have different evasion characteristics, this is no longer 
the case. Its sign depends on the relationship between good being taxed and labor (which 
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depends on the income tax rates by tax authorities A and B). If the good being taxed and 
labor supply are net complements, an efficiency loss would result due to the induced 
reduction in the work effort. As a result, goods that are net complements to leisure i.e., 
net substitute for labor, should be taxed more heavily on both equity and efficiency 
grounds. 
 The last term is a correction factor first discussed by Cremer and Gahvari (1993) 
and reflects the distortions that commodity tax evasion creates in the price of the good 
per unit of tax revenue collected. This distortion reflects the increase in concealment 
costs in the k-th industry, and accounts for the difference between increases in ekt  and pk. 
The higher this term, the smaller the increase in concealment costs and less social 
resources are wasted. The extended Ramsey now calls for a proportionate reduction in 
compensated demand to be smaller for goods that entail the smaller evasion distortions. 
 
Optimal Income Tax Rates 
 
 In presence of multiple tax collecting authorities, the optimal income tax rates set 
by tax authorities A and B are affected by evasion in incomes and commodity taxes. It 
may be noted that these tax rates are not close form solutions as there are obvious 
simultaneity between the two rates due to their mutual interdependence. To see this let us 
treat σ, t, σA, and σB as fixed and use (C.5) through (C.12), (D.1), (D.2), (4.11), (4.12), 
(4.19), and (4.20) and manipulate to get: 
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Proposition 4: With tax evasion by individuals from multiple tax authorities, the optimal 
income tax rates by the tax authorities A and B are characterized implicitly by the 
following formulae: 
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Proof: Use (4.13) and (4.21) and the definition of wb  in (5.2).   
 The two equations in the above proposition show the joint dependence of the 
income tax rates by the both tax authorities. Even though they do not give closed form 
solutions, they contain the main elements to characterize the optimal income tax policies 
in this prototype economy. In order to interpret these expressions, consider the income 
tax rate in the absence of income and commodity tax evasion provided by Dixit and 
Sandmo (1977): 
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where
w
b is the corresponding analog of wb defined above and Cov(,.,) denotes the 
covariance computed with respect to the ability distribution. It is easy to verify that (5.5) 
and (5.6) reduce to expressions similar to (5.7) when there are no income or commodity 
tax evasion, but they are not exactly the same due to inherent simultaneity in income tax 
rates between tax authorities A and B. In the standard interpretation, the covariance term 
in (5.7) reflects the social valuation of raising additional revenues by increasing taxes and 
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distributing the proceeds uniformly across the population. In other words, it shows the 
social value of a more progressive income tax. The denominator captures the welfare loss 
of the tax due to the negative substitution effects on labor supply. With the concavity of 
the social welfare function, the covariance term is negative so that an optimal tax solution 
involves a positive income tax rate. The counterpart to (5.7) with income tax evasion 
derived by Cremer and Gahvari (1994) under quasi-linear preferences is: 
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where m is the amount of income concealment analogous to ( )BABAk δδδδ +−−1 in our 
prototype economy. Thus, the basic formula is corrected to include the resource cost of 
income concealment. A comparison among (5.5) through (5.8) illustrates how the 
presence of income and commodity tax evasion and the simultaneity of income tax rates 
between tax authorities A and B affect the optimal income tax formulae. 
 The first two terms in the numerators of (5.5) and (5.6) are analogous to the 
covariance terms in (5.7) and (5.8), accounting for the different effects that changes in tA 
and tB have on the effective income tax rates eAt and eBt across individuals. These measure 
whether after accounting for differences in evasion behavior, income redistributions 
benefit individuals with a low or high social marginal utility of income. Note that the first 
terms in the numerators in (5.5) and (5.6) give the required compensation for the loss in 
the utility caused by a higher tax rate by the concerned tax authority. In (5.7), this is 
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simply given by the additional income taxes paid. With multi-agency tax evasion at work, 
this is no longer a reliable measure of welfare loss of an individual since eAt and eBt change 
with δA and δB and the outcome of audit lotteries. However, this is not apparent in (5.8) 
because with quasi-linear preferences, the proportion of income reported and 
hence eAt and eBt are constant across individuals. This is the key difference between the 
results of this essay and those derived by Cremer and Gahvari (1994). The second terms 
are the average marginal tax collections, also modified to account for differences in the 
taxes paid by individuals due to multi-agency income tax evasion. The third terms reflect 
the differences made by the presence of commodity taxes. These terms capture the effect 
of changes in the marginal tax rate by the respective tax authority on the marginal excess 
burden of existing commodity taxes as measured by the induced change in indirect tax 
revenue. Due to the negative semi-definiteness of the Slutsky substitution matrix, these 
terms are positive, so that the presence of commodity taxes tend to make optimal income 
tax rate by either authorities higher in order to compensate for the loss in commodity tax 
revenue to tax authority B. 
 The terms in the denominators measure the welfare losses of income taxation due 
to substitution effects, which now involve distortions in labor supply and the additional 
costs of income concealment from the tax authorities. Other things remaining the same, 
the higher the compensated labor supply and evasion responses to changes in tA and tB, 
the higher the efficiency costs of redistribution. Higher concealment costs tend to call for 
lower optimal tax rates relative to the case of no income tax evasion whatsoever. 
 Given that the denominators in (5.5) and (5.6) are negative and H(.) is strictly 
concave, a positive marginal tax rate requires that the numerators are negative. This will 
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be the case as long as there are net positive distributional gains from linear income 
taxation. This, in turn, requires that an increase in tA (tB) causes eAt (
e
Bt ) to increase more 
for higher ability individuals and/or 
B
c
A
t∂
∂δ (
A
c
B
t∂
∂δ ) is ‘large’ and positive. This would be the 
case if δA (δB) strictly decreases with w, i.e., if the high ability individuals conceal a 
lower proportion of their income. 
 
Tax Mix and Uniform Taxation: Some Specific Results 
 
 Expressions (5.2), (5.5), and (5.6) make it clear that the presence of evasion in 
commodity and the income taxes set by tax authorities affects the structure of direct and 
indirect taxation. In order to grasp the difference that each of the three components of 
evasion makes, let us consider some special cases in which the above formulae reduce to 
familiar expressions in literature. Of particular interest for the issues of uniform taxation 
and the optimal tax mix is the result of Deaton (1979). He shows that when preferences 
are weakly separable between leisure and goods with linear Engel curves, optimal tax 
system involves either (i) a linear income tax or (ii) equivalently uniform commodity 
taxes accompanied by a lump sum transfer. We will examine its robustness in the 
presence of multi-agency tax evasion. 
 Consider first the case that firms do not evade commodity taxes but individuals do 
evade their income taxes owed to authorities A and B. We thus have i ,∀= iei tt and the 
last term in (5.2) is equal to 1. Then, it might seem that optimality calls for a zero 
marginal income tax rate by tax authority B and the use of commodity taxes along with 
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the lump sum transfer for redistribution. By adjusting the vector of commodity tax rates 
so as to raise the same revenue as with the income tax in place, social welfare could be 
potentially improved in two ways: (i) eliminating the wasteful costs of income 
concealment and the costs of audits, and (ii) eliminating the uncertainty that ensues with 
income tax audit lotteries. This would allow a higher lump sum transfer or lower 
commodity taxation, and would eliminate the utility costs that audit lotteries impose on 
risk-averse individuals. 
 Nevertheless, at this level of generalization, this result could not be immediately 
established. With multi-agency income tax evasion, eAt and eBt vary across individuals so 
that the features of the multi-agency income tax system cannot be trivially reproduced by 
a uniform commodity tax that resembles a wage tax. If low ability individuals evade a 
higher proportion of their income than their high ability counterparts, reported income 
will still provide somewhat reliable signals of the rankings of true income. Since 
e
At and eBt will then be lower for low ability individuals, taxes would carry some 
information about the ability of individual types. Income tax evasion could then be served 
as passive “screening” devices to sift the low ability individuals from their high ability 
counterparts relaxing the information constraints faced by the tax authorities. With tax 
evasion the income tax systems operate as a non-linear tax schedule. It is then possible 
that evasion lowers both marginal and the average tax rates faced by low-income 
individuals and thus increase the progressivity of the income taxes. If these redistributive 
benefits outweigh the above welfare costs, then the optimal tax structure could still 
involve a mix of income and commodity taxes. 
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 Obviously, if high ability individuals tend to have high δA and δB, the optimal 
policy involves sole reliance on commodity taxation. In this case, as indicated before, the 
numerators of (5.5) and (5.6) would be positive and tA = tB = 0 is the optimal tax solution. 
Therefore, if high ability individuals evade proportionately more and evasion of 
commodity taxes is unimportant, then increasing reliance on commodity taxation 
approximates the “optimal” policy prescription set forth by the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund for the developing countries. 
 In contrast, as long as tA >0 and/or tB > 0, even without commodity tax evasion, it 
cannot be immediately presumed from (5.2) that commodity tax rates should be uniform. 
This again follows from the aforementioned non-equivalence between a wage tax and 
uniform commodity tax in this prototype economy. Since δA and δB and hence eAt and 
e
Bt vary with w, tax evasion introduces non-linear features into the income tax, which can 
be favorable to redistribution and are not trivially reproduced by commodity taxation. 
Moreover, individuals pay different proportions of their income in taxes regardless of 
their consumption patterns. If we allow, as Cremer and Gahvari (1994) did, individuals to 
pre-commit a given level of consumption of certain commodities regardless of the 
outcome of the tax audits, the optimal tax system would then involve a mix of 
differentiated commodity taxes together with an income tax for tax authority B. Hence, 
the advocacy of tax practitioners in developing countries for a heavier reliance on 
uniform commodity taxation cannot be justified on the grounds of differences in the 
evasion characteristics of taxes that favor commodity taxation. 
 Consider now the opposite situation where only commodity taxes are subject to 
evasion. Let us re-examine two specific results in the literature that make a case for 
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uniform commodity taxation: (i) exogenous (or untaxed) labor income and (ii) 
independent commodity demands. Using dots to refer to the value of the variables 
without income tax evasion, we can rewrite (5.2) as: 
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This is analogous to the optimal commodity tax rule obtained by Cremer and Gahvari 
(1993) for a representative consumer in a prototype economy of heterogeneous taxpayers 
with linear income taxes by A and B are in place. As we will see, most of their results 
generalize to the case where equity concerns are incorporated and a linear income tax is 
among the policy instruments for tax authority B. The left hand term—the index of 
discouragement—reflects the Ramsey efficiency arguments for taxing inelastic goods 
more heavily. The covariance term is negative if xk is a normal good and lower in 
absolute value for necessities; it reflects the equity concerns embodied in the social 
welfare function. On efficiency grounds the demand for the necessities should then be 
discouraged less by increased taxation. The last term is the distortion caused by 
commodity tax evasion in industry k. 
 When income is endogenous, we are back to a second best situation. As (5.2′) 
reveals, there is no a priori presumption that an optimal solution involves zero 
commodity tax rates, i.e., sole reliance on the linear income tax for tax authority B. More 
often then not differences in evasion behavior across industries tend to make optimal 
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commodity tax rates non-uniform; instead an optimal mix of differentiated taxes emerges 
(Cremer and Gahvari 1993). 
 When labor income is untaxed by the authority B, Deaton’s (1979) result – with 
weak separability between leisure and consumption along with identical linear Engel 
curves, income tax suffices – applies. In this case, the consumption pattern is the same for 
all commodities across the individuals, i.e.,
k
k
X
x
&&
&&
is the same for k∀ , so that commodity 
sales carry no information about individuals’ ability and differentiated commodity 
taxation can serve no redistributive role. In this case commodity tax evasion compounds 
the deadweight loss by adding the concealment and audit costs by tax authority B. In the 
general case, even though commodity taxes may still play a redistributive role, any such 
redistributive benefits have to outweigh the efficiency losses caused by concealment and 
audit costs by B. 
 It may be recalled that in the absence of commodity tax evasion and when 
commodity demands depend only on own price so that ki  ,0 ≠∀=∂
∂
k
i
p
x
, optimal 
commodity tax follows the so-called “inverse elasticity rule” when there is no commodity 
tax evasion and when commodity demands depend only on own price. Letting kkε be the 
absolute value of the average compensated own price elasticity of the k-th good, from 
(5.2′) we obtain: 
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In the absence of commodity tax evasion, this is simply the ratio of the “social luxury 
index” of kx (which calls for a lower price on necessities) and its compensated own price 
elasticity (which calls for a lower tax on such commodities). Deaton (1979) argues that 
since under additive preferences luxuries tend to be price elastic and necessities price 
inelastic, redistributive forces calling for a lower tax on necessities shown by the 
covariance term in (5.9) are offset by the efficiency pressure for a higher tax suggesting 
an approximate uniform tax solution. With commodity tax evasion, the result necessarily 
refers to the expected tax rate and setting the statutory tax rates and audit probabilities to 
be equal would not suffice to guarantee the result. This would now depend on whether 
the distortions of commodity tax evasion are greater in industries producing necessities or 
in industries producing luxuries. This, in turn, depends on the differences of the 
concealment cost technology. Since there is no a priori presumption of correlation 
between concealment costs and the elasticity of demand, the optimality of uniform 
commodity taxation is highly unlikely. 
 Finally, once redistributive concerns are introduced, it is not possible to conclude 
that with equal price responsiveness tax evasion increases the expected commodity tax of 
the good subject to evasion as in Cremer and Gahvari (1993). Fulfillment of the condition 
would now require the equality of the covariance term for both goods. 
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TAX EVASION AND PROGRESSIVITY OF INCOME TAXES 
 
 The foregoing analysis suggests that income tax evasion calls for lower marginal 
income tax rates set by tax authorities A and B and thus make linear income tax systems 
set by both the tax authorities less progressive. However, formulae in (5.5) and (5.6) give 
only implicit solutions. At this level of generalization it is impossible to make any 
specific conclusion. To derive specific conclusions we follow Cremer and Gahvari 
(1994): comparing the behavior of social welfare as tA and/or tB change with and without 
tax evasion. To this end we use quasi-linear preferences U(c, 1- l ) = c + f(1- l ) where c is 
a composite commodity with price normalized to unity. Using the results derived earlier, 
one can get the following simplified results: 
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With these results the expressions in (5.5) and (5.6) is simplified to: 
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Since individuals are now risk-neutral, the marginal utility of income is constant. 
Everybody chooses the same amount of income to report ( Aδ and Bδ ) so that eAt  and eBt  
are again constant. It is then evident that labor supply increases unambiguously with the 
earning potential of individuals, so does the pre-tax income. Income reports become a 
reliable indicator of individual’s well-being so that the numerators are unambiguously 
negative. The linear income taxes by tax authorities A and B will then be clearly 
progressive in that average tax rates increase with pre-tax income, exhibit properties 
closer to those in the absence of tax evasion. Nevertheless, one cannot infer whether tA 
and tB should be smaller than their counterparts in the absence of tax evasion. While 
marginal concealment costs still add to the social deadweight loss, the effect of tax 
evasion on the marginal excess burdens are ambiguous as both the level and elasticity of 
labor supply are affected by tax evasion. Since income differs with and without tax 
evasion, even in the most favorable conditions considered so far, a restriction on the 
shape of the social welfare function will not suffice to conclude that tax evasion lowers 
the progressivity of the income taxes. 
 
 
 
52 
 
 The difference between these findings and those of Cremer and Gahvari (1994) 
may be attributed to the specification of the concealment technology. Cremer and 
Gahvari (1994) allowed the probability of being caught to depend on the amount and 
proportion of income concealed as well as the amount spent in concealment. 
Nevertheless, their results on progressivity are derived under the special case when 
probability is not affected by the proportion of income evaded. With this restriction, labor 
supply is not affected by tax evasion. Since evasion behavior and concealment 
technology are independent of pre-tax income, everybody chooses to evade the same 
amount and spend the same in concealment. The probability of being caught is then 
effectively the same for everyone. Labor supply is unambiguously higher for high-ability 
individuals. High-income individuals evade a lower proportion of their income than their 
low-income counterparts and thus face higher effective marginal tax rates. Given that 
individuals evade the same amount and labor supply is not affected by evasion, 
concealment and audit costs make everyone worse off. Under these circumstances, it is 
not surprising that a lesser concern for redistribution embodied in the social welfare 
function leads to a less progressive tax system. 
 In our prototype economy, concealment technology consists of constant 
probability of being caught by tax authorities A or B or both but the concealment costs 
are proportional to the amount evaded. Individuals pick the same proportion of income to 
evade rather than the absolute amount; this then affects the leisure-consumption trade 
offs. In contrast to Cremer and Gahvari (1994), the proportions of income concealed turn 
out to be the same for everyone as well as the expected tax rates, but the high-income 
individuals evade more in absolute terms and pay higher concealment costs. Further, the 
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lower effective tax rates cause optimal labor supply to be higher in the presence of tax 
evasion. Additional assumptions are then required to resolve the ambiguities regarding 
the differences in the levels of lump sum transfers and marginal social welfare. Still, in 
the most favorable scenario, even though Aδ and Bδ are the same for everyone so that 
reported income still increases with pre-tax income, there remains the question of 
whether tax evasion makes the tax base a less reliable measure of well-being. 
 The forgoing analysis implies that it is not possible to come up with clear-cut 
statements regarding the effect of tax evasion on the progressivity of linear income tax 
system. Such statements are even more elusive under more general structures of 
individual preferences where income effects are important. The analysis does, however, 
point out some of the important elements involved. It does not follow that the social 
welfare loss imposed by concealment and audit costs necessarily makes the society worse 
off. It is possible that for tax evasion to have a positive impact on welfare through 
redistributions in the excess burden of the existing taxes. The impact on aggregate 
welfare would depend on the shape of the distribution of skills and how tax evasion and 
the concomitant concealment costs vary across the population. 
 
THE OPTIMAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE TAX BASE 
 
 An important aspect of our explicit modeling of the uncertainty that entails tax 
evasion is that the set of tax policy instruments now includes the audit probabilities, 
which provide an alternative way to raise revenues for the tax authorities. For instance, 
by increasing the audit probabilities and thus reducing the expected return to commodity 
tax evasion, tax authority B can induce firms to report a higher proportion of their sales 
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and can therefore increase revenue collections with lower tax rates. Since enforcement is 
costly and also causes distortions, it is important to characterize the trade offs involved in 
choosing these various alternatives. 
 
The Optimum Enforcement of Commodity Taxes 
 
 Using (D.8), (4.17) and (4.25) and undertaking similar simplifications that led to 
(5.2), we obtain an equivalent expression for the Ramsey rule in terms of audit 
probabilities: 
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The close resemblance of this expression to (5.2) comes without surprise. An increase in 
audit probability in the k-th industry raises the expected tax rate on xk at the cost of 
distorting the price of the good and at an additional audit cost which adds to social 
deadweight loss. The third term of this expression is thus analogous to the tax evasion 
distortion term discussed earlier. It captures the distortion that tighter enforcement creates 
in the price of xk per unit of tax revenue collected net of audit costs. It is evident that tk 
and kσ represent closely substitute instruments for tax authority B to raise commodity tax 
revenue. 
 
Proposition 5: The optimal trade off between higher commodity tax rates and tighter 
enforcement of commodity tax laws is characterized by the following relationship 
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Proof: Use (5.2) and (5.10) above.   
 This is exactly the result derived by Cremer and Gahvari (1993) in a 
representative consumer economy with no linear income tax. It simply says that, for 
optimality, the changes in commodity tax rates and audit probabilities that result in an 
increase of $1 in prices should yield the expected per unit increase in net tax revenue. 
The fact that the rule remains intact in this considerably more general setting means that 
the trade offs between higher tax rates and tighter enforcement of sales tax laws are not 
affected by equity considerations or tax evasion of income. The optimal policy is guided 
only by efficiency considerations in terms of how tax rates and audit probabilities affect 
the costs of output concealment and thus consumer prices. 
 
The Optimum Enforcement of Income Taxes 
 
 Slemrod (1994)  argues that the issue of the optimal progressivity of the income 
tax and the optimal enforcement of the tax system is intertwined. Earlier we found that, 
ceteris paribus, optimal income tax rates would tend to be lower the higher the costs of 
income concealments and the more elastic the response of Aδ and Bδ to changes in tA and 
tB. These two parameters are clearly a function of the audit probabilities Aσ and Bσ and 
therefore of the resources spent on audits. Audit policy offers an alternative means to 
increase expected tax revenue collections by discouraging income tax evasion. Under 
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random audits, this is achieved by setting the constant probabilities of audit. In contrast to 
the income tax rates, audit policy has an associated direct cost in addition to the indirect 
costs of any distortionary effects on individual and firm behavior. On the other hand, 
because of risk-aversion, there are social benefits from a higher audit probability 
resulting from the reduction of the risk of tax lotteries. Setting the optimal audit 
probability involves balancing these costs and benefits for different type of taxpayers. In 
order to evaluate this question closely, one can characterize optimal audit probabilities by 
holdingσ , t , At , and Bt  constant. Using (D.5), (D.6), (4.15), (4.16), (4.23), and (4.24), 
one can implicitly solve for σA and σB as function of At , and Bt along with other 
parameters and see how tax rates are affected as the audit probabilities change. However, 
at this level of generalization, it is not possible to give closed form solutions and hence 
any definitive conclusion again begs for empirical verification. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 In this essay we have extended the recent literature on the role of tax evasion in 
the design of an optimal tax system. We examined how the optimal mix and the 
characteristics of linear income and differentiated commodity taxes are affected in the 
presence of evasion by competitive firms and individuals (from tax authorities A and B) 
under uncertainty of random audits. Several important lessons were learned from the 
analysis. 
 First, the introduction of multi-agency tax evasion sensibly affects the orthodox 
prescriptions of the optimal tax literature. The standard optimal tax formulae should be 
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modified in such a way as to account for the impact of multi-agency tax evasion and 
audits. Further, the usual restrictions on individual preferences generally do not suffice to 
render either form of taxation as useless. In contrast to the current paradigm, we find that 
the presence of both income and commodity tax evasion makes a strong case for 
differentiated commodity taxation. Hence, we find little justification for the prescription 
based on the “Washington Consensus” that developing countries should rely heavily on 
uniform commodity taxation on grounds of differences in tax compliance. Insofar as 
differential tax rates can help minimize the differential price distortions created by 
commodity tax evasion, uniform commodity taxes are sub-optimal when concealment of 
sales varies across industries. Eventually, the optimal tax system involves a mix of linear 
income and differentiated commodity taxes. 
 Second, the expansion of the range of tax authorities’ instruments through 
inclusion of independent audits and sharing of audit information bring important changes 
to optimal tax policy. In essence, as a direct mechanism to control tax evasion, audit 
probabilities together with sharing information offer alternative ways to raise revenues so 
that some optimal trade offs with tax rates emerge. By directly affecting tax evasion and 
the concomitant concealment, audit policies and information sharing affect the responses 
of taxpayers to changes in tax policies. Any level of revenues by tax authorities A and B 
can now be achieved through a combination of taxes, audits and information sharing. 
Further, in the case of income tax evasion, independent audits and sharing of audit 
information offer a direct welfare enhancing mechanism by reducing individuals’ 
exposure to audit risks. 
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 Third, we find little justification for the prevailing orthodoxy that tax evasion 
calls for lower optimal marginal tax rates and reduce the progressivity of income taxes. 
However, these results seem to critically hinge on modeling evasion of income taxes and 
the associated concealments. Our formulation allows evasion to affect directly the terms 
of labor-leisure trade off. Further, whether tax evasion affects negatively the 
distributional properties of the income taxes depends on the shape of the distributional 
skills of individuals and how the proportions of income concealed varies across the 
taxpayers. 
 The issues dealt with in this essay can be expanded to several directions. First, it 
would be theoretically interesting to analyze the issues using a game-theoretic approach. 
As several studies found, tax authorities do not pre-commit the audit rules but base such 
decisions depending on the nature and extent of returns filed by the taxpayers. Second, 
our model is based on competitive market structure. While this assumption is analytically 
tractable it does not fit well with real world data especially from the developing 
countries. It would be interesting to explore the commodity tax evasion under various 
non-competitive market structures. Third, it would be interesting to see if and how our 
conclusions change once expected utility maximization is replaced by generalized non-
expected utility or prospect theory. Fourth, it would be of primary policy interest to 
conduct simulations of the model in order to quantify the parameters highlighted in the 
essay.
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ESSAY II: SPATIALITY AND PERSISTENCE IN THE U.S. INDIVIDUAL 
INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 The income tax system in the United States operates on a self-assessment basis. 
Individuals annually determine their tax liability and pay whatever they deem due. In the 
course of time taxpayers learn more about the tax system, especially about the loopholes 
of the tax code. Individuals also can and possibly do communicate with other filers in 
filing their own returns. Insofar as the taxpayers may recall their own past filing 
experience and may communicate with other taxpayers, these issues provide a rough 
basis to shape the nature and extent of this year’s reporting amount. Thus, two interesting 
phenomena emerge from past reporting experience and exchange of information and 
experience with other filers: one of them relates to the dynamic behavior of the taxpayer; 
the other shapes the nature and extent of spatial dependence. 
 If the individual got away with tax evasion in the past, she may tend to evade 
more this year. If she was audited and caught cheating by the IRS in the past, she may 
tend to evade less this year. In either case this year’s tax evasion decision is shaped by the 
past evasion experience. There is, thus, an element of persistence in individual income 
tax evasion in the United States. Dubin (2004) gives another explanation for the possible 
persistence in tax evasion. He argues, “…taxpayers may adjust their reported taxes based 
on a mixture of taxes reported in the previous year and the optimal level of taxes due 
based on existing or current conditions.” He cites delayed audit completion cycle as a 
possible reason for the presence of persistence.
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 There are several possible explanations of the second phenomenon. Given that 
taxpayers usually exchange their experience with each other, they influence and are 
influenced by the tax evasion behavior of the other taxpayers. However, the precise 
nature of interaction between the taxpayers with regard to evasion decision hinges on the 
nature of enforcement by the IRS; if the enforcement of tax codes is strict in the sense 
that they have a target revenue collection in mind, then higher evasion by one taxpayer 
should be followed by lower evasion by the other, thereby resulting in a negative 
relationship. If, instead the enforcement of the tax codes were lax, then a higher evasion 
by one taxpayer would follow non-negative evasion by the other taxpayer. In view of the 
declining audit rates by the IRS over the years, the latter scenario seems more plausible 
than the former. Hence, we expect a positive relationship between the reporting behaviors 
of two taxpayers. 
 There is a possible alternative explanation for the above interdependence 
phenomenon. Suppose the IRS has a fixed amount of revenue in mind. In that case, if one 
of the taxpayers successfully evaded more of her tax liability it increases the probability 
of being audited of the other taxpayer. In this case the dependence comes through the 
probability function and leads to a negative relationship in the reporting behaviors of two 
taxpayers. 
 Alm, McClelland, and Schulze (1999) provide another explanation of the 
interdependence of tax compliance. They argue that “… an individual will comply as 
long as he or she believes that compliance is the social norm. Conversely, if 
noncompliance becomes pervasive then the social norm of compliance disappears.” They 
test this paradigm with experimental data and find substantive evidence. Their argument 
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and the experimental findings also imply that there is a positive relationship between the 
reporting behaviors of two taxpayers. 
 There is a third explanation based on experimental evidence by Manski (1991). 
He argues that individuals faced with dynamic stochastic decision problems that pose 
immense computational challenges may simply look to others to infer satisfactory 
policies. McFadden (2006) argues that interpersonal dependence “… works through … 
learning by imitating rather than learning by doing. … (P)rimary information … come(s) 
from others,  through observation, advice, and association. … In addition to providing 
information, social networks may discipline the behavior of members through consensus 
on social norms, accountability of choices, and sanctions for behavior that violates 
norms.” 
 These twin issues of persistence and spatial dependence, albeit with their 
importance, are never raised in the theoretical models nor tested in the empirical analyses 
of income tax evasion. This essay will, thus, succinctly extend the original Allingham-
Sandmo-Yitzhaki model of income tax evasion by incorporating the above twin issues. It 
will also test the empirical validity of these issues in the context of the U.S. federal 
individual income tax evasion. As will be reviewed later in this essay, several empirical 
studies have been conducted to assess the determinants of income tax evasion in the U.S. 
However, if either of the issues has had any role in shaping the magnitude and growth of 
income tax evasion, then those results were biased and/or inconsistent. Hence, any policy 
prescription based of those results will be misleading. 
 The “tax gap” attributable to individual income tax has grown from $29 billion in 
1973 to $81 billion in 1981. It was reduced to $70 billion in 1985 before jumping to $95 
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billion in 1992. According to various IRS sources, the annual tax gap is estimated to be 
$345 billion, or about 10 percent of what is collected each year from individuals and 
businesses. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) estimates that three-quarters of this tax 
gap is attributable to individual taxpayers. At that rate, individuals currently represent 
$260 billion of the tax gap, which is close to triple the level estimated in 1985. The rising 
loss in tax revenues due to non-compliance has drawn attention of the policymakers. The 
successive U.S. governments have taken several measures to reduce this ever-yawning 
gap. In the light of apparent magnitude and growth of the tax gap, the time seems right to 
reassess the determinants of individual income tax evasion. These issues will also warrant 
some modifications of the original Allingham-Sandmo-Yitzhaki model of income tax 
evasion. 
 The essay is organized as follows. In the next section we briefly review the past 
studies conducted on individual income tax compliance. Section 3 extends the original 
Allingham-Sandmo-Yitzhaki model by incorporating persistence and spatiality. Section 4 
deals with data and related methodological issues. Section 5 discusses the methods 
employed in the empirical work and analytical issues related to the construction of 
variables. Section 6 presents the descriptive statistics and the estimation results where the 
spatiality and persistence issues are examined separately. The final section summarizes 
the findings, discusses their implications, and suggests areas for further research. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 After the seminal works by Allingham and Sandmo (1972), Srinivasan (1973), 
and Yitzhaki (1974), theoretical work on tax evasion has progressed in leaps and bounds. 
 
 
 
63
 
 
 
 
In contrast, the empirical literature has been thwarted primarily due to lack of data on tax 
evasion. We focus on those studies that directly link to our point of departure set forth in 
the Introduction. Further, we confine our analysis to the empirical studies. In doing so, 
we divide the review into two sections: cross-sectional studies and time-series studies. 
Cowell (1990), Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein(1998), Alm (1999), and Slemrod and 
Yitzhaki (2002) provide summaries of literature on tax evasion from both the theoretical 
and empirical fronts. Also, we confine ourselves within the purview of individual income 
tax evasion as opposed to corporate income tax or sales tax evasion. 
 
Cross-section Studies 
 
 The empirical dimension of tax evasion literature started with Clotfelter (1983) 
based on the 1969 TCMP data. He divides the income tax returns into three broad groups: 
non-business returns, non-farm business returns, and farm returns and estimates a tobit 
model, explaining, for each group, noncompliance as a function of the combined federal 
and state marginal income tax, after-tax auditor-adjusted gross income, and set of 
demographic variables available on tax returns. The most striking conclusions are: (i) net 
income and marginal tax rates positively affect evasion; (ii) wages as proportion of 
adjusted gross income (AGI) and interests and dividends also as proportions of AGI 
negatively affect how an individual underreports. Note that his finding on the effects of 
marginal tax rates is inconsistent with the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model. Married 
taxpayers were found to underreport more than the single taxpayers. 
 Witte and Woodbury (1985) aggregate the 1969 TCMP data at the three-digit zip 
code level. They discuss how direct audit, audit of the other classes, multiple penalty and 
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progressive tax structures together with community characteristics affect individual 
income tax evasion. Using SURE estimation method they find that taxpayers evade less 
as lagged direct audit rate increases. They argue that increase in any of the three measures 
of penalty discourages evasion if the taxpayers are risk neutral or risk averse. They also 
find that tax evasion is positively related to “opportunities” for evasion and related to 
income in a non-linear way, with non-compliance at its highest at both very low and very 
high levels of income. Their finding of positive association between information 
reporting and taxpayer compliance provides a strong empirical support to the TEFRA 
1982. 
 Slemrod (1985) studies the issue of primary and secondary tax evasion based on 
one-fourth of the data from stratified random sample of the U.S. Treasury File for 1977. 
He uses an index of the presence of evasion to position taxable income with the fifty-
dollar bracket and regresses dummies for fungible items, age, and marital status together 
with adjusted gross income and marginal tax rate. He finds that the tendency to evade 
taxes is associated with higher marginal tax rates, the presence of fungible items, being 
less than 65 year of age and being married. If income is added to the list of regressors, the 
coefficient of the marginal tax rate switches sign from positive to negative. However, 
none of the coefficient estimates are precise. His estimates, thus, fail to distinguish the 
tax effect from the income effect. Besides, his comparison of models’ coefficients with 
and without income variable is inconsistent with basic econometrics in that if income is a 
valid regressor then estimates in column 1 of his Table 3 biased and estimates in column 
2 are correct. But if income is not relevant, then coefficient estimates of column 2 are not 
efficient. 
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 Poterba (1987) uses one observation from each of the 1965, 1969, 1973, 1976, 
1979, 1982 TCMP data sets. He discusses how the marginal tax rate affects capital gains 
tax evasion. He finds that a decrease in the marginal income tax rate discourages evasion, 
even though the coefficient estimate is not precise. However, with six observations and 
three parameters to be estimated, any inference is highly unreliable. 
 Beron, Tauchen, and Witte (1988) use five of the seven groups of the 1969 TCMP 
data aggregated at the three-digit zip code level. Using 2SLS, they estimate three separate 
equations for reported AGI, reported tax liability, and the log odds of an audit. They find 
that the deterrence effect of audit is small and it is more effective for detecting income 
subtractions than the report of income itself. One notable omission of their work is the 
marginal tax rate. Further, their use of 2SLS to deal with the simultaneity problem is not 
convincing; more could be gained by utilizing the system GMM estimation method. 
Tauchen, Beron, and Witte (1989) apply the same technique on the 1979 TCMP 
individual data and find similar results. Additionally, they find that the “ripple effect” of 
audit is many times higher than the revenue yields from the direct audit. 
 Dubin and Wilde (1988) divide the 1969 TCMP data set into seven audit classes. 
They discuss whether the IRS audit rate is endogenous and, if so, how it affects evasion 
among these audit classes. They use the IRS budget as an instrument variable to estimate 
taxpayers’ compliance behavior equation. They find that the audit rate is an endogenous 
variable in four of the seven audit classes. Moreover, the effect of the IRS auditing 
strategies outweighs the deterrent effect in three of the four cases in which audit rates are 
endogenous. 
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 Alm, Bahl, and Murray (1990) develop a model to discuss how public policies 
affect taxpayers’ evasion and avoidance behavior. Policy variables include marginal tax 
rates, payroll tax contributions and benefits, probability of auditing, and penalty rules. 
They use 1983 Jamaican micro level data to estimate the share equations for the tax bases 
that rise with higher benefits for payroll tax collections and falls with higher marginal tax 
rates. Further, tax bases also fall with more severe penalties and a higher audit probability 
as individuals substitute avoidance for evasion. 
 Alm, Bahl, and Murray (1991) use 1983 Jamaican micro level data to discuss how 
the self-employed people evade income tax in response to policy changes. They find that 
a lower marginal income tax rate deters evasion. Moreover, fraction of income declared 
by the self-employed people increases less than that of their actual income. 
 Feinstein (1991) adopts a “fractional detection model,” which captures the fact 
that IRS examiners can detect some (but perhaps not all) of income tax evasion. He uses 
a small portion of the individual-level data from the 1982 and 1985 TCMP data sets. He 
discusses how income, marginal tax rate, and various socioeconomic characteristics of 
the filers affect tax evasion and finds that the both the likelihood and magnitude of 
evasion increases with taxpayers’ income and the marginal tax rate when he uses the two 
TCMP data sets separately. 
 Kamdar (1995) examines the importance of information reporting on the tax 
compliance of individuals using data from the 1971 TCMP. He estimates separate 
compliance equations for incomes subject to differential reporting requirements and find 
that third-party information reporting is an important deterrent to noncompliance. 
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 Martinez-Vazquez and Rider (2005) examine the theoretical and empirical 
implications of accounting for multiple modes of tax evasion we use the 1985 TCMP to 
estimate an empirical model with two modes of evasion and find that increased 
enforcement effort has a positive effect on compliance in the targeted mode, a negative 
effect in the untargeted mode, and a positive overall effect on tax compliance. 
 
Time-series Studies 
 
 Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde (1987) use 2SLS method to estimate the determinants 
of tax evasion based the state-level data in the Annual Report 1977-85. They use the IRS 
budget per return and the percentage of income tax returns filed to total tax returns filed 
as instruments for the audit rate. Further, they use “percentage of individual income tax 
returns per audit” (i.e., “the amount of penalty” over the “total collections from individual 
income tax”) as a measure of taxpayers’ noncompliance. Their explanatory variables are 
as follows: the lagged audit rate, the lagged socioeconomic variables such as the 
unemployment rate, the percentage of adult population with a high school education, per 
capita income, per capita income squared, the percentage of population over 45, the 
percentage of population employed in the manufacturing, and time trend. They find that 
the following variables positively affect taxpayers’ noncompliance (at the 1 percent 
significance level): the percentage of adult population with a high school education, per 
capita income, time trend, and the predicted lagged audit rate. The last one implies that 
the IRS audit rate is endogenously determined. In contrast, “the unemployment rate” and 
the “per capita income squared” negatively affect “the percentage return per audit” at the 
1 percent significance level. Finally, the actual lagged audit rate negatively affects (but 
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only at the 20 percent significance level) “the percentage return per audit.” This implies 
that an increase in the audit rate deters evasion. However, the deterrent effect is 
dominated by the effect of the IRS effort on auditing. 
 There are some notable problems in Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde (1987). First, they 
use eight years’ state-level data, which is perhaps not enough to capture the 
interdependent actions of the taxpayers and the IRS. Second, they should not include 
employment taxes in calculating total collections of individual income tax. They made 
this mistake because the Annual Report does not separate the employment tax from the 
individual income tax at the state-level. Third, more importantly, their dependent 
variable, “the percentage return per audit” is inappropriate to reflect how much a taxpayer 
evades. It should be replaced by “penalty per return examined”, which conforms to the 
theoretical model of Allingham-Sandmo as amended by Yitzhaki. Finally, they neglected 
the information on the sources of individual income presented in the Individual Income 
Tax Returns (later in the Statistics of Income Bulletin), which is more relevant than some 
of their states’ characteristics variables. Finally, their model is incomplete in that it does 
not consider the effect of marginal tax rate on evasion. 
 Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde (1990) also use 2SLS method to discuss the same issue 
raised in Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde (1987): the overall role of audit rates in the Federal 
revenue collections process. Their data sources are the Annual Report 1977-1986 and the 
Individual Income Tax Returns (later in the Statistics of Income Bulletin). They consider 
that audits may have “spillover” effects. The “spillover” effects mean that people report 
more taxes when they believe audits are more likely, no matter whether they are actually 
audited or not. They use “the IRS budget per return” and “number of information returns 
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other than W-2 form filed divided by total number of returns” as instruments for the audit 
rate equation. They use “the reported taxes per returns filed” in the Individual Income 
Tax Returns as a measure of taxpayers’ compliance. The explanatory variables include: 
the current audit rate, socioeconomic variables and a time dummy. The socioeconomic 
variables can be decomposed into three types, the first of which is only related to the tax 
base. It includes: the percentage of population over 65, total number of households on 
welfare divided by the total number of households, and total number of households 
divided by the number of population. The second one is only related to taxpayers’ 
compliance behavior. It includes: the percentage of adult population with a school 
education, the percentage of the workforce employed in manufacturing, total number of 
farms divided by total population, the percentage of labor force in a service industry. The 
third one is related to both the tax base and taxpayers’ compliance behavior. It includes: 
per capita income, the unemployment rate, and the average state income tax rate. Their 
findings are as follows: per capita income positively affects the reported taxes per return 
filed (at the 1 percent significance level). In contrast, the following variables negatively 
affect the reported taxes per return filed (at the 10 percent significance level): total 
number of farms divided by total population, the percentage of the work force employed 
in service industry, the state income tax rate, and the unemployment rate. Finally, the 
audit rate is an endogenous variable and is positively related to reported taxes per return 
filed. 
 Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde (1990) also suffer from some notable shortcomings. 
First, they still neglect information on the sources of taxable income in the Individual 
Income Tax Returns (later in the Statistics of Income Bulletin). Second, they may bias 
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their results when they include “per capita income as an explanatory variable. We never 
observe the “actual income” in the aggregate-level data. When we use “per capita 
income” as a proxy for “actual income”, the effects of other variables on “the reported 
taxes per return filed” may be masked. This is because “per capita income” and “the 
reported taxes per return filed” are highly positively correlated but may not be causally 
linked. Finally, it is impossible to separate the tax base effect from the compliance effect 
on “the reported taxes per return filed” for the third type of socioeconomic variables. 
 Plumley (1996) extends the analysis in Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde (1990) using the 
state-level data from 1982 to 1991. He modifies some of the compliance equations by 
incorporating the income and offsets equations and the ratio of tax returns filing to 
expected filings. He is the first to show that criminal investigation enforcement activities 
are significant and positively related to compliance. 
 Dubin (2004) uses the state-level data between 1988 and 2001 to discuss the 
effects of criminal investigation enforcement activities on taxpayers’ compliance 
behavior. This is perhaps the only study that tries to explore one of the issues we will be 
investigating later in our empirical analysis. Using the dynamic panel estimation method, 
he concludes that criminal investigation activities have a measurable and significant 
effect on voluntary tax compliance. While incarceration and probation have the most 
significant effect on compliance, sentenced cases and media attention do not seem to 
have any significant influence. 
 The past studies, even without the above two crucial issues, present conflicting 
evidence as to the relative importance of sanctions, audit rates, and marginal tax rates on 
tax compliance. In general, sanctions are negatively related to evasion in the theoretical 
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models of tax compliance (Allingham and Sandmo 1972), but are often statistically 
insignificant in empirical studies (Witte and Woodbury 1985). Audit rates are significant 
for some, but not all audit classes (Dubin and Wilde 1988), and the relationship between 
the marginal tax rates and the level of compliance is still a polemic issue in the empirical 
studies (Yitzhaki 1974; Clotfelter 1983; Slemrod 1985; Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde 1987, 
1990). Besides, none of the studies reviewed above addresses the twin issues raised in the 
Introduction. Because empirical models without addressing the issues of spatiality and 
persistence will be misspecified, the ignorance of the above issues may well render their 
results biased and inconsistent and the policy prescription based on any of those studies 
will be misleading.  
 
A MODIFIED MODEL OF INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE 
 
 Before we make any effort to incorporate the interdependence and the persistence 
a caveat is in order. That is, no single theoretical model can address all three different 
explanations outlined in the Introduction simultaneously. Therefore, our approach is both 
eclectic and demonstrative. Let us start with the original Allingham-Sandmo-Yitzhaki 
model of income tax evasion. Consider an individual i whose true income at time t, yit, is 
known only to him but not to the tax authority. Tax is levied at constant rate, τit, on the 
declared income. However, with some probability pit taxpayer i will be subject to 
investigation by the tax authority and if found under reported will be subject to a penalty 
rate, θit, on the evaded income, Eit. Note that θit is higher than τit. As discussed earlier, 
taxpayer i in evading the amount Eit from the tax authority takes into consideration the 
amount successfully evaded in the previous period, Eit-1, by himself as well as the 
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amount, Ejt, contemporaneously evaded by another taxpayer, j. Suppose the IRS audit 
rule is as follows: whether or not individual taxpayer i will be audited this year depends 
on how much that individual evaded last year as well as how much individual j evades 
this year. 
Thus, individual i’s after-tax income is state dependent and given as 
 
( )itititit EyyW −−= τ1   if she is not caught cheating, and   (3.1) 
itititititit EyyW τθτ −−=2  if she is caught cheating    (3.2) 
 
Suppose that the individual maximizes Neumann-Morgenstern utility. Taxpayer, i, will 
then choose Eit so as to maximize 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )itEitτitθityitτityitUjtE1itEitpitEityitτityitUjtEitEitpitUE −−−+−−−−= 11  (3.3) 
 
where E is the expectation operator, and ( )
jt
E
1it
Eitp −  implies that evasion of income by 
individual i at time t is conditional on his evasion in the previous period together with the 
contemporaneous evasion by another individual j. 
 Now if conditioning of pit on Eit-1, Ejt is ignored, the familiar Allingham-Sandmo-
Yitzhaki first order condition can be derived as 
 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2'1' ..1 WUpWUp ititititit θ=−        (3.4) 
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where single prime on shows the first partial derivative of Uit with respect to Eit, W1 and 
W2 are after-tax-income in the two states of nature as defined above. In this case all of the 
basic results of the Allingham-Sandmo-Yitzhaki model follow. However, if the 
probability of being audited is conditional on Eit-1, Ejt, it greatly complicates the analysis 
of the optimal choice of Eit, since both Eit-1, Ejt are now arguments on both sides of the 
first order condition (3.4). The influence of Eit-1 or Ejt on Eit can be obtained by totally 
differentiating (3.4) treating all other parameters constant for the sake of brevity: 
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where the double prime on Uit shows the second partial derivatives with respect to Eit. 
From the second order condition characterizing the optimal choice of Eit, the first term in 
the denominator of the right hand sides of (3.5) and (3.6) must be negative. Also, the first 
term in the numerator of the right hand sides of (3.5) and (3.6) must be positive. Hence 
the impact of a change in Ejt or Eit-1 on the level of Eit depends on the sign of the second 
term in each of the cases. Insofar as the sign of 
( )
jtdE
itdp . or 
( )
1
.
−itdE
itdp cannot be determined a 
priori, the sign of the impact of either Ejt or Eit-1 or both must be determined empirically.  
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The solution of the taxpayer’s utility maximization results in the following general 
functional form: 
 
( )ititjtit XEEfE ,, 1−=         (3.7) 
 
where itX is set of characteristics that influences the evasion behavior of the individual, 
and Eit, Eit-1, and Ejt are as defined above. This brings us to the issue of testing dynamic 
and/or spatial effects. This is done after we describe the data used in the model and some 
methodological issues. 
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 
 
 The empirical analysis of this essay is based primarily on the state, district, and 
regional level data collected from the Annual Report of the Commissioner of the Internal 
Revenue as well as the IRS Data Book for 1979-1997. Appendix E presents the list of the 
IRS districts and regions. These publications contain state-level information on the 
number of individual income tax returns filed, the number of returns examined and the 
amounts of additional taxes and penalties recommended by the IRS offices at the district 
and regional levels. The IRS also records data on these variables against the service 
center(s) of the IRS regions. For data reported against service centers, treatments are 
given as follows: the number of returns examined that are recorded against the IRS 
service center(s) in a region are prorated among the constituting states in proportion to 
the number of returns filed; the amount of additional taxes and penalties recorded against 
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the service center(s) in a region are prorated among the constituting states in proportion 
to the number of returns examined. 
 The recent IRS Reform Act reorganized the entire district system and required 
many district offices to be responsible for the tax returns filed by multiple states. As a 
result, most of the district-level statistics in 1997 included services provided to multiple 
states. Since only state-level data are used in the analysis, we take the 1996 allocations of 
examinations, additional taxes for each state among all states in the newly defined 
districts and extrapolate the annual figures for 1997 based on the 1996 proportions. For 
states with multiple districts, the district-level data are aggregated to the state level. 
Further, the data on Adjusted Gross Income (AGI), the number of returns with wages and 
salaries, with itemized deductions, and the total number of exemptions are obtained from 
the Statistics of Income Bulletin of the IRS. 
 These are augmented by data on ‘retail trade employment’, ‘proprietors’ 
employment’, ‘service sector employment’, and ‘total employment’ from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis. The data on total, non-white, and population over 65 years of age, 
and the Gini coefficient were obtained from the Statistical Abstracts of the United States 
from the Bureau of the Census. Finally, the unemployment data are obtained from the 
Handbook of U.S. Labor Statistics. Along with the variables dictated by the tax evasion 
model, these additional variables were used in many of the previous studies. 
 From the IRS data, additional taxes and penalties recommended were divided by 
the number of individual income tax returns filed in a state to get a proxy for the 
individual income tax evasion (Eit). We, however, know that additional taxes and 
penalties recommended differ from the additional taxes and penalties assessed due to 
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subsequent bilateral and legal settlement between the IRS and the individual corporation. 
But, data on the additional taxes and penalties assessed are not available from the IRS 
published documents. 
 Even though the probability of detection is related to a myriad of factors, audit 
rates have traditionally been regarded as the most important. We thus use the number of 
individual income tax returns examined divided by the number of individual income tax 
returns filed times 100 to get a proxy for individual income tax audit rate. Audit rates 
have been the focus of much attention in the tax evasion literature, and the IRS believes 
that audits are one of the most effective deterrent tools. It may, however, be noted that the 
central focus on audit is changing in the IRS. Since the 1980s the IRS has been 
intensifying the use of other deterrence and enforcement tools to supplement the 
declining role of audit. Unfortunately, data on these tools by state and year are not 
publicly available. 
 We form four new variables from data available in the Statistics of Income 
Bulletin and the IRS Data Book: (i) per return adjusted gross income: adjusted gross 
income divided by the number of individual income tax returns filed; (ii) percent of 
returns filed with wages and salaries: total number of returns filed with wages and 
salaries divided by total number of returns filed; (iii) percent of returns filed with 
itemized deductions: total number of returns filed with itemized deductions divided by 
total number of returns filed, and (iv) per return exemptions: total number of exemptions 
claimed divided by total number of returns filed. 
 From the BEA employment data, we created three series: (i) percent of 
proprietors’ employment: total number of proprietors divided by total number of people 
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employed; (ii) percent of retail trade employment: total number of people employed in 
retail trade divided by total number of people employed; and (iii) percent of service 
sector employment: total number of people employed in the service sector divided by 
total number of people employed. 
 Non-compliance in our model is not independent of the marginal tax rates. In 
order to test the relationship between tax rates and the tax evasion of the individual we 
need a measure of individual tax rate. We resolve this issue by using the dollar weighted 
marginal tax rates available at from the National Bureau of Economic Analysis.2 These 
rates are calculated by the NBER TAXSIM model from micro data for a sample of the 
U.S. taxpayers. The figures are generated by first calculating the tax liability of each 
eligible return, and then increasing all income types by 1 percent and recalculating the tax 
liability under the assumption that itemized deductions are constant. The difference in 
aggregate tax divided by the difference in aggregate income is the marginal tax rate on 
the average dollar of income. 
 The rates take account of most features of the tax code including the maximum 
tax, minimum tax, alternative taxes, partial inclusion of social security, earned income tax 
credit, phase outs of the standard deduction and lowest bracket rate, etc. Because state of 
residence for taxpayers with AGI>$200,000 is not given in the data, high income 
taxpayers are assigned randomly to states in proportion to the number of high income 
taxpayers listed in the Statistics of Income annual volumes of the Internal Revenue 
Service. Thiss caveat should be borne in mind while interpreting the coefficient of the 
variable. 
                                                 
2 See at http://www.nber.org/~taxsim/ally/ally.csv for details; Internet, accessed in May, 2006. 
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 Data on the marital status were also obtained from the NBER.3 Similar to data on 
marginal tax rates, these data are also are available by state and by year for returns with 
AGI≤ $200,000. Returns with AGI > $200,000 are, therefore, prorated based on the 
distribution of income in the state in that particular year. This caveat should be borne in 
mind while interpreting the coefficient of the variable. 
 
ECONOMETRIC MODELS 
 
 Following our discussion of the possible presence of the spatial effect and 
dynamic effect, we posit a general model in which an individual i’s income tax evasion 
(Eit) depends on individual j’s income tax evasion behavior, on that individual’s past 
income tax evasion, and on a set of local socioeconomic variables: 
 
itiitit
N
ij
jtijit uEEE ++′++= −
≠
∑ ηβγωρ x1 ;  i = 1, …, N; j = 1, …, N;   (5.1) 
      and t = 1, …, T 
itεωλ += ∑
≠
N
ij
jtijit uu ;    i = 1, …, N; j = 1, …, N;  (5.2) 
t = 1, …, T 
 
Since we use a cross-section of states over time, subscripts i and t represent an average 
individual in the state and time periods, respectively; ρ is a scalar parameter measuring 
the slope of the reaction function; ωij are spatial weights used to compute the effect of the 
                                                 
3 The author is grateful to Dr. Daniel Feenberg, NBER, for making data on marital status available. 
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individual income tax evasion of states relevant to state i; ωij ≠ 0 if individuals in states i 
and j interact strategically, and, by convention, ωii=0; xit is (k×1) is a vector of individual 
i’s socioeconomic conditions, γ the coefficient of  persistence in evasion, and β is the 
corresponding vector of coefficients on the other conditioning variables. The first element 
of xit is unity to allow for the intercept. We assume that the parameters ρ, γ and β are 
constant across time and space. The spatial and the dynamic analyses are special cases of 
the above general model. We will discuss the estimation technique in one type of analysis 
assuming that the other effect is absent for the sake of brevity. Further, we omit 
discussion of the features of the model when neither spatial effects through the dependent 
variable or the error term nor the dynamic effects are present, for it then becomes a 
typical panel model whose features and estimation techniques are outlined in any 
standard text on panel econometrics. However, it may be noted that even simple fixed or 
random effects model will produce biased results in this case since the audit rate is 
endogenous. 
 
Estimation of Panel Model with Endogenous Audit Rate 
 
 Since the audit is endogenous, we need to find proper instruments to address it. 
Some of the past studies used the IRS cost per return as an instrument for this purpose. 
However, for us this is a bad instrument in that both the costs per return and the audit rate 
are jointly determined. Besides, the cost per return directly affects the level of tax evasion 
thus violating the fundamental assumption of being a valid instrument. In order to 
substantiate our claim, we checked the validity of the instrument for audit rate. When cost 
per return alone is used as an instrument, it makes the audit coefficient statistically 
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insignificant; when used with other instruments the test of over-identifying restriction is 
rejected. Thus, one needs to look for instruments that have no direct effect on the level of 
tax evasion but influence the audit selection. These instruments are the political 
affiliation of the President of the United States, the composition of both chambers of the 
U.S. Congress, and the party affiliation of the state Governor. The choice of these 
instruments is guided by Schulz and Wood (1998), who argue that audit enforcement is 
by and large governed by the responsive of the IRS to elected officials. Our assumption is 
that the audit rate of individual income tax would be lower if the party affiliation of the 
President is Democratic, the Senate and the House each have a Democratic majority and 
the state governor is Democratic. This negative association can be expected not because 
the Democrats are lenient to tax evaders but because they are proclaimed to be pro 
general public as opposed to pro corporation and rich. We checked the validity of 
instruments using Sargan (1958) test of over-identifying restrictions and found that our 
instruments as valid. This will be detailed while discussing the fixed and random effects 
instrumental variable estimates. 
 
Estimation of Spatial Panel Dependence with Spatial Error Correlation 
 
 Note that the usual panel model, spatial panel model and dynamic panel model are 
all special cases of the above general model. For, instance, let us assume that the dynamic 
effect is absent. Then forming vectors of observations in t, the model becomes 
 
ttttt uβXEρWE +++= ηNI ;   t = 1, …, T     (5.3) 
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where Et=(E1t,…,ENt)′ is the (N×1) vector of individual income tax evasion for the cross-
section of N states at time t, Wt an (N×N) matrix of spatial weights, and Xt is an N×K 
matrix with rows given by the set of vectors x′it; η is a (N×1) vector of the unobserved 
heterogeneity, and ut is the corresponding (N×1) error term vector. 
 Under this structure, tax evasion is determined endogenously in equilibrium 
because the spatial lag term, WtEt, is correlated with the error term, ut, and ordinary least 
squares (OLS) yields inconsistent estimates of the parameters. It is therefore commonly 
estimated by using maximum likelihood techniques (Anselin 1988; Anselin and Hudak 
1992). Removing the simultaneity in model (5.3), estimation can be carried out with 
alternative methods under the assumption that errors are iid. The reduced form equation 
is 
 
( ) ( ) ( )t-1tNt-1tNt uρWIβXρWIE +−+−= ηNI    ; t = 1,…, T   (5.4) 
 
where IN denotes an identity matrix of size N. Equation (5.4) can be estimated by 
maximum likelihood method under normality assumptions. Case, Rosen, and Hines 
(1993) were, perhaps, the first to use this method in the case of fiscal policy 
interdependence. 
 Even in the absence of spatial autocorrelation (ρ=0), the estimation of model (5.4) 
can lead us to conclude erroneously that there is interaction if the error term itself is 
subject to spatial autocorrelation, for example, in the form of (5.2) written in matrix form: 
tttt uWu ελ += ;   t = 1, …, T      (5.5) 
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where εt is distributed with mean zero and covariance matrix 2εσ IN. In this case, spatial 
dependence in the error—for example, resulting from similar geographical conditions —
can induce correlation in tax evasion even though individuals may have no interactions. 
Uncorrected spatial correlation in the error term would not affect the consistency of the 
estimated parameter β, but it would reduce its efficiency. If there is strategic interaction 
(ρ≠ 0), ignoring the spatial lag term WtEt in the estimation is more serious, since it yields 
inconsistent estimates of β. It is important therefore to test for both kinds of spatial 
dependence (in the dependent variable and in the error term). 
 Maximum likelihood estimation is complicated when we account for spatial 
correlation in the error term by possible identification problems (Anselin 1988). We 
follow the instrumental variables approach because it avoids this issue, it is 
computationally easier to implement, and it does not require distributional assumptions 
on the error term ε. W assume that the parameters (β′, ρ)′ and ( 2εσ , λ) are time-invariant. 
This allows us to estimate the model pooling the panel of observations, stacking them 
over the time index as: 
 
uβXρWEE +⊗++= ηTN iI ;   t = 1, …, T    (5.6) 
with 
ελ += Wuu ;    t = 1, …, T     (5.7) 
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where E = (E1′,…, ET′)′and ε = (ε1′,…, εT′)′ are (NT ×1) vectors, with T equal to the total 
number of periods. X is the (NT ×K) matrix of stacked exogenous variables, and η is a 
(NT×1) vector of the unobserved heterogeneity. W is an (NT ×NT) block-diagonal matrix 
of spatial weights, with T copies of W along the diagonal, in the case of time-invariant 
weights, and with matrices (W1,…, WT) in the case of time-variant weights. IN is an 
(N×N) identity matrix and iT is a (T×1) vector of unity. Finally, we assume that the 
covariance matrix of ε is given by 2εσ INT. 
 When the true model is given by the (5.6) and (5.7), an application of Kelejian 
and Prucha’s(1998) generalized two stage least squares (G2SLS) procedures performed 
in three steps is outlined as follows. In the first step the (demeaned) regression model in 
(5.6) is estimated by 2SLS procedure using the instruments [ ]XWWXXH 2 , ,⊂  that are 
linearly independent columns. In the second step the spatial error correlation parameter λ 
is estimated in terms of the residuals obtained via the first step and the generalized 
moments procedure suggested by Kelejian and Prucha (1999). Finally, in the third step, 
the original (demeaned) regression model in (5.6) is re-estimated by 2SLS after 
transforming it via a Cochrane-Orcutt type transformation to account for the spatial error 
correlation. 
 
Estimation of Dynamic Panel Model 
 
 Instead if we assume that the spatial dependence and the spatial error effects are 
absent, the model involving (5.1) and (5.2) becomes a dynamic panel model. In the 
context of a persistent dependent variable and endogenous regressors, neither fixed 
 
 
 
84
 
 
 
 
effects nor the random effects nor even the spatial panel estimators outlined above gives 
consistent estimates. As argued earlier, one of the right-hand-side variables in (5.1) is 
correlated with the random error term. This contention is confirmed by Hausman (1978) 
test in the next section. This makes both the fixed effects and the random effects 
estimates inconsistent. For this reason, in addition to the usual panel and spatial panel 
estimators, we estimate the instrumental variable estimation following Anderson and 
Hsiao (1982), Arellano and Bond (1991), and Blundell and Bond (1998) to obtain 
consistent estimates of tax evasion equation in the presence of dynamics and endogenous 
explanatory variables. Essentially, the approach involves writing the model in (5.1) and 
(5.2) without the first terms, and first difference (5.1) to get rid of the individual 
heterogeneity as: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )1itit'2it1it1itit uuEαEE −−−−−− −+−+−=− β2it1it xxE     (5.8) 
 
 By construction, the differenced lag of the tax evasion equation ( )21 −− − itit EE  in 
the above equation is endogenous. Further, as noted earlier, xit contains endogenous 
variables, such as the audit rates. Therefore, we need instruments to consistently estimate 
the above equation. The differenced right-hand-side variables are instrumented with 
appropriately lagged levels. On the assumption that the error term in (5.2) are serially 
uncorrelated, i.e., ( ) 0=isituuE , the following moment condition yield the appropriate 
instruments for the differenced lagged dependent variable and the endogenous 
explanatory variables.  
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( ) 0=∆− itsit uEE for t = 3, …, T and s ≥ 2      (5.9) 
 
( ) 0=∆− itsit uE x for t = 3, …, T and s ≥ 2      (5.10) 
 
 When the moment conditions (5.9) and (5.10) hold, one can use the lagged levels 
variables as instruments for the first differenced variables. However, when the lagged 
levels are weakly correlated with subsequent first differences, the Arellano and Bond 
(1991) differenced GMM estimator suffers from small sample bias (Blundell and Bond 
1998).  To deal with the potential problem with the differenced GMM estimates, Arellano 
and Bover (1995) proposed an estimator that makes use of additional information in 
levels. This relatively new estimator is referred to as the system GMM estimator. This 
approach combines two sets of equations—one set in the first differences and another in 
levels—into a system of equations. This introduces additional T-2 moment restrictions 
given by: 
 
( )[ ] 01 =∆+ −ititi EuE η          (5.11) 
 
( )[ ] 01 =∆+ −ititi uE xη          (5.12) 
 
 The system GMM estimator uses the moment conditions in equations (5.9) 
through (5.12) to consistently estimate the parameters of interest in equation (5.1) under 
the assumption made at the beginning of this sub-section. 
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 It should be noted that valid instruments should be correlated with the included 
endogenous explanatory variable(s) and, at the same time, orthogonal to the error term. 
To ensure the validity of the instruments, we conduct the Sargan (1958) test of over 
identifying restrictions to jointly test the appropriateness of the instruments.4 The null for 
the test is that the instruments are valid in that they are not correlated with the errors. 
Under the null, the test statistic is distributed as ( )2 kL−χ , where L is the number of 
instruments and k is the number of parameters in the model. 
 Further, as noted earlier, the consistency of the GMM estimation depends on 
whether errors in the levels equation are white noise. If the errors are serially correlated 
the GMM will lose its consistency. We thus, test for the second order autocorrelation in 
the differenced equation. The test statistic developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) is 
detailed in their appendix along with its distributional characteristics. By construction, we 
expect first order serial correlation in first differenced equation but not second or higher 
order autocorrelation. 
 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
 This section covers the empirical results obtained from estimating the various 
models developed in the previous section. After the descriptive statistics of the data, we 
start off with the most restricted estimates—the simple panel IV estimates—as the 
benchmark. We then relax the assumption of spatiality and persistence in sequence to see 
what happens to the estimates. We find that the simple estimates are biased since these 
estimates ignore the twin issues of spatiality and persistence. Along the same line of 
                                                 
4 Also see Hansen (1982) for details. 
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argument, the spatial and dynamic panel estimates in isolation are also biased since either 
of the estimates ignores the other effects. This bias of the dynamic panel estimate is 
confirmed when we checked the Moran I and LM statistics of the error term. 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 The definition and the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the study are 
presented in Table 1. The average real per return evasion of individual income taxes is 
about $4 thousand over the sample period. The mean individual income tax audit rate is 
1.4 percent. The average marginal income tax rate (state and federal combined) is 30 
percent. However, it varies between 22 and 43 percent across states and years. The mean 
real adjusted gross income is about $30 thousand. About 85 percent of the returns are 
filed by earners of wages and salaries which contain information of income and tax 
withheld by the third-party, the employers. 
 About one-third of the returns filed present itemized deductions and more than 
two exemptions for dependants are claimed. However, there are wide variations in both 
filing with itemized deductions and claimants of dependants across years and states. 
Around half of the returns are filed jointly by married couples. 
 The IRS spends around $28 for running the administration of which enforcement 
is a major component. Of the total per return costs, it incurs $22 as compensation to the 
personnel at the national office and the field staff in the IRS districts and regions. Of the 
rest, a sizeable amount is spent for legal pursuit of the cases against the evaders. It is 
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puzzling why the IRS does not expand its audit coverage when one compares the costs 
and returns of the tax base enforcement. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of the Variables Used: 1979-97 
 
Variables Mean Std. Min Max 
Per Return Evasion ($) 3774.152 1905.116 1045.989 20858.460
Audit Rate (%) 1.418 0.633 0.407 4.827 
State & Federal Combined Tax Rate (%) 29.897 3.323 22.440 42.910 
Real AGI ($ 000) 29.532 4.068 20.150 49.737 
Returns with Wages & Salaries (%) 85.296 3.673 61.017 94.131 
Returns with Itemized Deduction (%) 30.580 7.294 13.432 50.292 
Per Return Exemption (no.) 2.285 0.188 1.505 2.953 
Joint Returns (%) 46.237 5.554 26.980 65.220 
Proprietors in Total Employment (%) 16.786 3.688 9.314 27.179 
Retail Trade in Total Employment (%) 16.524 1.164 11.646 19.777 
Services in Total Employment (%) 25.472 4.735 15.804 43.670 
Elderly Population (%) 12.370 2.414 2.740 21.186 
Non-white Population (%) 18.738 13.594 0.683 71.441 
Gini Coefficient 0.377 0.026 0.330 0.446 
Unemployment Rate (%) 6.425 2.129 2.225 18.017 
Party Affiliation of President* 0.368 0.483 0.000 1.000 
Senate Democrat Ratio 51.632 4.936 45.000 58.000 
House Democrat Ratio 57.871 5.112 46.897 63.678 
Party Affiliation of State Governor* 0.566 0.492 0.000 1.000 
Real Personnel Costs Per Return ($) 21.90 5.76 12.76 47.89 
Real Capital Costs per Return ($) 0.75 0.60 0.08 6.23 
Real Other Costs Per Return ($) 6.31 2.13 1.72 19.20 
Note: *Party affiliation of the President = 1 if he is Democrat and 0 otherwise. Party 
affiliation of the State Governor is similarly defined. 
 
 It must be remembered that compliances by the individuals are influenced by 
many other factors not included in the above list. Appendix F gives correlation matrix 
between the variables involved. There is no high correlation between the explanatory 
variables and their partial correlation with dependent variable implies that the variables 
explain part of the variation in the income tax evasion. 
 
 
 
89
 
 
 
 
 There is no definite time trend in the data except per return evasion and the audit 
rate. While per return shows an upward trend, the audit rate shows the downward trend. 
The mean per return evasion was less than $3000 between 1979 and 1985 but jumped to 
around $4000 after 1986 and stayed around at that level. Apparently this is a 
contradictory finding in that the TRA was introduced in 1986 and was in effect during 
this period. 
 In contrast, the audit rate was around 1.7 percent between 1979 and 1885. But it 
dropped to barely above 1 percent after the TRA was introduced. When plummeting audit 
rate is juxtaposed with soaring tax evasion, it resolves the apparent ineffectiveness of the 
TRA. That is, the IRS was not given enough resources to bring the evaders to book. The 
resource constraint for tax base enforcement was equally a common phenomenon when 
the Republican and the Democratic presidents held power. 
 
Estimation Results 
 
 Table 2 reports the results of the simple fixed and random effects models with 
treatment given to the endogeneity of audit rate as discussed before but ignoring both the 
persistence and the spatial effects. Even though these are intermediate results, we will 
make some passing remarks and compare them to the findings of the previous studies 
along this line. Note that these fixed effects results assume that all effects are in long-run 
equilibrium. However, even if we ignore the spatial effects discussed later, taxpayers are 
assumed to change their behavior and modify their reported taxes due based on their past 
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experience. We conducted test for individual heterogeneity by performing an F-test.5 The 
null is that there is no individual heterogeneity. The test statistic reported at the bottom of 
Table 2 rejects the null at 1 percent significant level implying evidence of individual 
effects in the data. We also conducted the Hausman (1978) test in order to decide which 
set of results are valid. The estimated test statistic reported at the bottom of Table 2 
implies the explanatory variables are correlated with the individual heterogeneity and 
hence the fixed effects estimation is the appropriate procedure. 
 Note that most of the explanatory variables included in model affect the tax 
evasion at the 10 percent level with expected signs. Based on these results one arrives at 
conclusions similar to Jou (1992) but not Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde ((1990) because these 
latter authors used different dependent variables in their analyses. However, these results 
albeit corrected for endogeneity of the audit rate are still biased because both the dynamic 
and spatial effects discussed earlier are ignored. 
 Since we have only one endogenous variable and we used three instruments for it, 
the model is over-identified. We thus conducted the test of over-identifying restrictions 
following Sargan (1958) and Hansen (1982) that are used in IV estimation. The test 
statistic reported at the bottom of Table 2 shows that the instruments are valid. However, 
the strength of these instruments should be judged in the light of conditions outlined in 
Bound, Jaeger, and Baker (1995). The main condition is that use of weak instruments can 
lead to inconsistent IV estimates. Further, these biases are in the same direction as the 
OLS estimates in finite samples. 
 
                                                 
5 This test procedure is detailed in Baltagi (2001). 
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Table 2. Fixed and Random Effects IV Estimates 
 
Variables FE Estimates RE Estimates 
Audit Rate -1,692.694*** -1,487.922*** 
 (359.013) (398.446) 
State & Federal Combined Marginal Tax Rate -118.311*** -105.664** 
 (40.264) (42.572) 
Adjusted Gross Income 28.414 79.381*** 
 (33.419) (27.596) 
Percent of Returns with Wages and Salaries -19.313 -86.811*** 
 (40.846) (33.589) 
Percent of Returns with Itemized Deduction 59.787*** 47.932** 
 (19.936) (19.161) 
Number of Exemptions per Return 2,516.503*** 2,584.621*** 
 (936.129) (744.535) 
Percent of Joint Returns Filed 6.103 -10.448 
 (21.854) (19.603) 
Percent of Proprietors in Total Employment 3.226 21.012 
 (74.968) (42.873) 
Percent of Retail Trade in Total Employment 92.051 -36.763 
 (120.289) (87.968) 
Percent of Service Sector in Total Employment 219.119*** 147.435*** 
 (54.112) (30.570) 
Percent of Elderly Population -237.947*** -186.450*** 
 (89.122) (61.228) 
Percent of Non-white Population 41.041** 26.014*** 
 (16.832) (9.463) 
Gini Coefficient -12,427.455** -4,893.577 
 (5,081.210) (4,433.670) 
Unemployment  Rate -90.748** -33.285 
 (42.234) (36.187) 
Constant 2,944.570 7,591.937** 
 (4,498.785) (3,517.772) 
Observations 950 950 
Individual Effects [F(49,886)] 6.81***[0.000] 
Sargan-Hansen Test [χ2(3)] 8.711**[0.0334] 
Hausman Test [χ2(14)] 41.84*** [0.0001] 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. One asterisk implies significant at 10 percent; two 
asterisks imply significant at 5 percent; and three asterisks imply significant at 1 percent. 
Figures in the brackets are p-values. 
 
 
 The fixed effects IV estimator is less efficient if the audit rate is in fact not 
endogenous. Therefore, it is useful to test for endogeneity of the audit rate to see whether 
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the IV estimation method is at all necessary. In order to do this, we do our panel 
regression analysis in two stages: in the first stage, we regress the audit rate on the party 
affiliation of the U.S. President, the ratio of Democrats to the Republicans in both the 
chambers of the U.S. Congress, and the party affiliation of the State Governors, and all 
other exogenous variables in the original model. We then substitute the predicted value of 
the audit rate for the actual audit rate and estimate the model by panel estimation method. 
 
Table 3. Reduced Form of Audit Rate 
 
Variables Dependent Variable: Audit Rate 
Party Affiliation of President -0.104** (0.047) 
Senate Democratic Ratio 0.023*** (0.007) 
House Democratic Ratio -0.055*** (0.007) 
Party of Affiliation State Governor -0.003 (0.031) 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. One asterisk implies significant at 10 percent; two 
asterisks imply significant at 5 percent; and three asterisks imply significant at 1 percent. 
We do not report all other coefficients except those associated with the instruments. 
 
Table 4. Test of Endogeneity of Audit Rate 
 
Variables Dependent Variable: Evasion 
Audit Rate -1,692.694*** (354.153) 
Residual of Audit Rate 611.027* (374.269) 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. One asterisk implies significant at 10 percent; two 
asterisks imply significant at 5 percent; and three asterisks imply significant at 1 percent. 
We do not report all other coefficients except those associated with the actual audit rate 
and the residual from the first stage regression. 
 
 The results of the first stage regression are summarized in Table 3. Audit 
enforcement becomes lax with a Democratic President and majority Democrats in the 
House in power. This may imply that the Democrats try to serve the interest of the 
common people as opposed to the Republicans who are alleged to serve corporate 
interests. If this claim is valid then sign of coefficient of the ratio of Democrats in the 
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Senate is “wrong.” Finally, as expected, state Governors have little influence over the 
federal audit strategy in their states. We do not discuss this equation as it is a reduced 
form equation as opposed to structural form of the audit equation. 
 Finally, the test in Table 4 supports the hypothesis that audit rate is endogenously 
determined. This is because the estimate for residual of the audit rate from the first stage 
regression is different from zero at the 10 percent significance level. However, the 
marginal significance cast doubt about the strength of these instruments and reminds us 
of the observations made by Bound, Jaeger, and Baker (1995). 
 Estimation of the tax evasion model specified in (5.6) and (5.7) requires 
specification of proximity of states. According to the theory outlined in the earlier section 
individual i’s tax evasion behavior is dependent on j’s behavior. Given the per capita 
state data on evasion some metric of proximity must be used. However, the weight matrix 
must be exogenous to the regressors. Anselin (2002) pointed out that construction of the 
distance metric based on any of the regressors makes the model highly non-linear with 
endogeneity problem that must be instrumented out. As a result of this constraint, use of 
weight matrix based on income or population is ruled out. At the same time the weight 
must be meaningful enough to represent dependence in the dependent variable or the 
error term. 
 In view of these we selected three alternative metrics: (i) neighbors belong to the 
same Division in the U.S. Bureau of Census, (ii) neighbors belong to the same Region in 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis, and (iii) neighbors belong to the same Region in 
Internal Revenue Service. Note that clustering of states based on the above are not ad 
hoc; rather they are based on the co-movement of several socioeconomic factors. As such 
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these matrices contain both time variant information such as per capita income 
differential and time invariant such as their geographic proximity. 
 As indicated earlier, the efficiency and properties of estimators as well as the 
properties of other statistics will in general depend upon whether or not a model’s 
disturbance terms are indeed spatially correlated and whether the models have spatially 
lagged dependent variable. As a result, it is important to estimate spatial correlation both 
in the dependent variable as well as the error term and check if there are strategic 
dependence both in the dependent and the error term. Any evidence in either of these 
evidence will render the panel estimates discussed earlier biased and/or inconsistent. 
 Table 5 reports the results of the general spatial model. It, however, still ignores 
the dynamic persistence. Note that the spatial lag coefficient is not precise when weight 
matrix is defined following BEA Regions or Census Divisions; it is only marginally 
significant when the weight matrix following the IRS regions. The last results indicate 
that there is strategic interaction among neighboring states in the determination of 
individual income tax evasion. Furthermore, this interaction suggests a positively sloped 
reaction function in tax evasion, as expected. In terms of elasticity, a unit less measure, a 
10 percent increase in the individual income tax evasion in the neighboring states results 
in an increase of 3.3 percent in a state’s individual income tax evasion. It may be noted 
that the coefficient of the spatial error switches sign when the spatial weight is based on 
the IRS divisions. Most of the explanatory variables are statistically significant. Since the 
estimate of spatial error correlation is significant, it is evident that there are substantial 
spatial error effects. 
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Table 5. General (Kelejian–Prucha) Spatial Estimates 
 
Variables Weight Matrix 
 BEA Regions Census Divisions IRS Regions 
Spatial Dependence (λ) 0.052 0.111 0.333*** 
 (0.124) (0.102) (0.125) 
Audit Rate -1333.700*** -1536.540*** -1017.580*** 
 (277.869) (295.184) (253.037) 
State & Federal Combined -61.031** -46.316 -85.478*** 
Marginal Tax Rate (29.621) (30.772) (27.550) 
Adjusted Gross Income 133.242*** 135.441*** 122.209*** 
 (21.035) (21.230) (20.496) 
Percent of Returns with -141.376*** -133.916*** -146.127*** 
Wages and Salaries (23.082) (23.539) (22.572) 
Percent of Returns with 14.786 7.675 22.437* 
Itemized Deduction (14.055) (14.522) (13.475) 
Number of Exemptions per Return 3105.910*** 3168.220*** 2896.470*** 
 (560.109) (564.977) (542.387) 
Percent of Joint Returns Filed -35.175** -34.882** -36.255** 
 (16.773) (16.893) (16.342) 
Percent of Proprietors 28.865 38.752 12.280 
In Total Employment (29.133) (29.761) (27.822) 
Percent of Retail Trades -105.693* -122.069** -78.602 
In Total Employment (60.517) (61.265) (58.775) 
Percent of Service Sector 122.904*** 132.239*** 101.762*** 
In Total Employment (21.488) (22.087) (19.818) 
Percent of Elderly Population -181.809*** -197.601*** -142.734*** 
 (39.991) (41.305) (37.569) 
Percent of Non-white Population 12.486** 13.160** 9.594* 
 (6.042) (6.111) (5.860) 
Gini Coefficient 3226.750 2781.480 4543.490 
 (3390.990) (3423.020) (3262.750) 
Unemployment  Rate 57.165* 66.212** 49.506* 
 (30.809) (31.376) (30.038) 
Constant 8057.850*** 7202.390** 7799.750*** 
 (2863.510) (2914.450) (2772.660) 
Spatial Error (ρ ) 0.087*** 0.073*** -0.009*** 
 (0.001) (0.020) (0.001) 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. One asterisk implies significant at 10 percent; two 
asterisks imply significant at 5 percent; and three asterisks imply significant at 1 percent. 
 
 Since we have identified that there is strategic interaction (mainly through the 
error), the effects of the exogenous variables will have an impact on the entire 
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configuration of equilibrium level of individual income tax evasion. This is true even if 
they take place in only one of the interacting states; through their repercussions on the 
state’s tax evasion they may exert significant influence on the tax evasion behavior of the 
other states. As will be detailed out later, the so-called Moran I and LM statistics 
vindicate our claim. It may, however, be noted that the spatial estimation results, albeit 
elegant, are both biased and inconsistent as the estimation ignores the persistence in tax 
evasion. 
 The results of Arellano-Bond Dynamic GMM estimation are presented in Table 6. 
These results are nice and elegant with most of the coefficients vary in the expected way. 
However, the estimates show the combined effects of direct and spatial influences. 
However, if we look at the spatial diagnostic tests, which indicate serious spatial 
correlations, it is evident the results are potentially misleading due to model 
misspecification. To that end, we conducted spatial diagnostic tests detailed in Appendix 
G. The results of Moran I and the LM statistics presented in Table 7 imply that there are 
indeed spatial effects no matter what form of the contiguity weight matrix is used. Thus 
the results of the Arellano-Bond GMM estimates should be interpreted with caution. 
 In order to check the validity of the instruments used in the Arellano-Bond GMM 
estimates we conducted the test of over-identifying restrictions. The Hansen (1982) 
statistic implies that the lagged values used as instruments satisfy the moment conditions 
discussed before. The Arellano-Bond estimators introduce first order serial correlation in 
the data, but if there are higher order serial correlations in the data then use of this 
estimator is inappropriate. 
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Table 6. Arellano-Bond GMM Dynamic Panel Estimates 
 
Variables Coefficient Estimates 
Lagged Per Return Evasion 0.400*** 
 (0.023) 
Audit Rate -1,215.226*** 
 (136.653) 
State & Federal Combined Marginal Tax Rate -47.026** 
 (18.282) 
Adjusted Gross Income 147.171*** 
 (29.990) 
Percent of Returns with Wages and Salaries -103.292*** 
 (24.733) 
Percent of Returns with Itemized Deduction 74.758*** 
 (11.192) 
Number of Exemptions per Return 2,963.688*** 
 (638.264) 
Percent of Joint Returns Filed -28.945 
 (31.068) 
Percent of Proprietors in Total Employment 116.383** 
 (48.130) 
Percent of Retail Trade in Total Employment 101.651 
 (178.937) 
Percent of Service Sector in Total Employment 67.320** 
 (28.987) 
Percent of Elderly Population -99.903** 
 (48.214) 
Percent of Non-white Population 6.035 
 (10.390) 
Gini Coefficient 10,183.174*** 
 (2,339.135) 
Unemployment  Rate 170.505*** 
 (39.437) 
Constant -7,149.161*** 
 (2,527.553) 
Observations 900 
Hansen Test[χ2(34)] 37.00 [0.332] 
AR(1) -3.36 [0.001] 
AR(2) -0.89 [0.375] 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. One asterisk implies significant at 10 percent; two 
asterisks imply significant at 5 percent; and three asterisks imply significant at 1 percent. 
Figures in the brackets are p-values. 
 
Table 7. Spatial Diagnostics of Errors 
 
Weight Matrix Moran I Statistic LM Statistic 
BEA Regions 0.049***(2.630) 5.944[0.015] 
Census Divisions 0.078***(3.785) 12.894[0.000] 
IRS Regions 0.060***(4.871) 19.829[0.000] 
Note: Figures in the parentheses are z- statistics, those in the brackets are p-values 
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 We also test for first and second order serial correlation following Arellano and 
Bond (1991). The results reported in Table 6 show evidence of first order serial 
correlation but absence of any higher order serial correlation. 
 We find that audit rate constrains the level of evasion irrespective of the type of 
weight matrix used. These results are similar to previous findings based on cross-section 
and time-series data (Tauchen, Witte, and Beron 1989; Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde 1990). 
Our results suggest that raising the audit rate by one percentage point would have 
decreased the level of evasion by more than one third of a percent from the mean level. 
This is equal to a reduction of more than $1200 of evasion in the short run. Given the 
estimated persistence of around one quarter, the reduction is more than $2000 per 
individual return. These results offer strong support for the deterrence effect of audit. Our 
results also suggest that the decline in the audit rate over the last three decades may be 
partly responsible for the decline in voluntary tax compliance. 
 One of the novelties of our results is the use of combined actual average marginal 
tax rates for the federal and state governments. Most of the past studies had to use the 
average state tax rate for this purpose. Contrary to the popular orthodoxy, our results 
suggest that evasion decreases as the marginal tax rate increases, a result reminiscent of 
Yitzhaki (1974) who argued that if penalty is proportional to the taxes evaded, then an 
increase in the marginal tax would unambiguously decrease the level of evasion if there is 
decreasing absolute risk aversion of income. Our results suggest that an increase in the 
marginal tax rate by 10 percentage points would decrease the level of evasion by 0.2 
percentage point in the short run. Given the level of persistence this implies that a 10 
percent increase in the audit rate would decrease evasion by about one third of a percent 
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from the mean level. This also dispels the misconception that the federal income tax rate 
in the U.S. has reached the maximum of the so-called “Laffer Curve.” 
 The coefficient of adjusted gross income (AGI) is positive and significant. These 
results are consistent with the hypothesis of increasing absolute risk aversion, commonly 
accepted as a reasonable assumption in models of individual choice under uncertainty. 
Our results suggest that a one percent increase in the AGI would lead to more than one 
percent increase in evasion in the short run and more two percent in the long run. 
 The percent of returns filed with wages and salaries was associated – as expected 
– with better compliance. Clotfelter (1983) cited two possible factors for such a strong 
positive relationship. First, as wages and salaries are held by a third party and report to 
the IRS, the taxpayers may well be convinced that detection of evasion is more likely 
with these types of income. In addition, these incomes are relatively simple to report in 
the tax form. Our results suggest that a one percent increase in the returns filed with 
wages and salaries would be associated with more than two percent decline in the level of 
evasion in the short run and about four percent in the long run. In contrast itemized 
deductions and the number of exemptions claimed are not subject to any verification 
unless the return is audited. As such these variables were found to be positively 
associated with the level of evasion. While a one percent increase in the returns with 
itemized deductions increases evasion by about $74, successful claim of an additional 
exemption per return increases evasion by about $3000. 
 There are tendency for the married couple to evade less than the other groups but 
the coefficient estimates is imprecise. These results corroborates finding of some of the 
previous studies (Tauchen, Witte, and Beron 1989) but at variance with others (Kamdar 
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1995). However, in the absence of any solid theoretical foundations, the above results 
should be interpreted with caution. Moreover, the parameter estimates are also imprecise. 
Hence any policy prescription based on these estimate would be fraught with danger. 
 Several past studies and anecdotal observations point to certain groups for tax 
noncompliance. Some of these include income from sole proprietorship, retail trade, and 
service sector employments. To examine these propositions, we used the percent share of 
proprietors, retail trade, and service sector employment to total employment, with an 
expected positive relationship between evasion and each of them. The results corroborate 
our claims in that we found strong positive relationship between evasion and percent 
share of proprietorship and service sector and imprecise but positive with the retail trade. 
 The elderly population appears to have tendency to evade less than their younger 
counterparts. Dubin, Graetz, and Wild (1990) found similar relationship in their 
estimation. One explanation for this relationship could be that most of the elderly live at 
the subsistence income level and hence do not have any supernumerary income to hide 
from the tax authorities or even a fewer of them exceed the threshold income level to file 
a tax return. 
 Contrary to popular myth, the percent of population that is nonwhite is not 
significantly related to evasion although there is an imprecise but positive relationship 
between their fraction in the population and the level of evasion. Since most of the 
nonwhite population are at lower income stratum and the evasion is used in this essay is 
an average measurement, this may mask the true relationship, because Tauchen, Witte, 
and Beron (1989) find a positive relationship between the nonwhite population and the 
level of evasion for the low income audit classes. 
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 It is usually postulated that social norms break down in societies with high 
income inequality. Since tax payments is strongly shaped by social norms (Alm, 
McClelland, and Schulze 1999) we expected a positive relationship between the level of 
tax evasion and the extent of income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient. Our 
results corroborate the above proposition. 
  The positive relationship between the rate of unemployment and the level of 
evasion suggests that evasion becomes higher during economic recession. These findings 
are similar to most of the previous studies (Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde 1990; Jou 1992). 
One of the reasons for this relationship could be that unemployed people work in the 
underground economy for cash payments and do not report their income. Our results 
suggest that a three percent reduction in unemployment rate would lead to about one 
percent decline in the level of evasion in the short run and more than one percent in the 
long run. 
 Following Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde (1990), we also make an experiment about 
the intertemporal effects of declining audit rate. Based on the estimates based on the 
unfiltered and filtered data reported in Table 6, we calculated the predicted values of the 
level of evasion that would have declined had the audit rate remained at the 1981 level. 
By 1996 we estimate that maintaining the audit rate at the 1981 level would have reduced 
total evasion by $48.5 billion. As noted above the estimates based on these estimates are 
contaminated due to the ignorance of spatial effects. In view of the positive spatial effects 
both through the dependent variable and the error term this amount is certain to rise. 
However, in the absence of any estimates that deals with both the issues simultaneously 
the precise magnitude cannot be measured. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
 The identification of persistence and strategic interaction in models of individual 
income tax evasion has important implications for the equilibrium configuration of tax 
evasion. In this essay we attempted to modify the basic Allingham-Sandmo-Yitzhaki 
model of individual income tax evasion and tested it with state level data of individual 
income tax evasion. We found evidence of both persistence and strategic interaction 
among individuals in the cluster of states in the determination of tax evasion behavior. 
Interaction among states that belongs to a particular group or region based on the BEA, 
Census or the IRS criteria, appeared to results in dependence, weakly through the level of 
evasion but strongly through common but unidentified shocks. 
 We initiated an important econometric problem: how to account for spatial effects 
in the dynamic panel data model. Since individuals interact and their tax evasion and 
influence and are influenced by others either directly or through some common 
unobservable shocks, one expects spatial dependence either directly or indirectly. In 
addition individuals learn by doing. As no unified approach exists to address this twin 
issue, we left the two loose ends untied. 
 Our results are encouraging, however, because once the presence of persistence 
and strategic interactions is identified, the natural extension is to try to account for 
specific models of tax evasion to analyze the normative implications of tax evasion 
behavior we discussed in the Introduction. 
 In our analysis we only used weight matrices that are time invariant for obvious 
reason of filtering limitation. It is well established that the results of spatial analysis are 
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very sensitive to the choice of the weight matrix. Thus, in order to check the robustness 
of our results one needs to use a variety of weight matrices such as the so-called 
Mahalanobis distance etc. 
 Further, we did not model explicitly the source of strategic interaction between 
individuals. This is a limitation of the analysis in the sense that the source of interaction 
is not identified. Also, the empirical analysis is based on the U.S. data. It would be 
interesting to see if this conclusions hold for other developed and developing countries. 
 It would have been ideal to estimate the spatial and the dynamic effects 
simultaneously. However, such an estimation method is not available at the moment. 
Hence, it would be interesting to devise an estimator that can tackle these issues and 
check its robustness using Monte Carlo experiment. 
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APPENDIX A: THE PRIMAL PROBLEM OF THE CONSUMER 
 
 
 Given the preference function of the taxpayer defined in (3.15) the Lagrangian is: 
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The first order conditions for interior solutions can be written as: 
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ijjj xUS ll  is the ‘weighted’ average of marginal utilities of leisure 
and jλ are the usual Lagrange multipliers. 
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APPENDIX B: THE DUAL PROBLEM OF THE CONSUMER 
 
 
 Given the dual problem of the taxpayer defined in (3.39) the Lagrangian and the 
first order conditions for an interior solution are: 
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whereν is the usual Lagrange multiplier. 
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APPENDIX C: SOME COMPARATIVE STATIC RESULTS 
 
 
 The following relations are derived by differentiating the identities (3.40) – (3.43) 
with respect to pk, tA, tB, θA, θB, σk and assuming that both leisure and at least one of the 
goods are normal. 
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APPENDIX D: SOCIAL WELFARE MAXIMIZATION OF THE ‘SUPER 
GOVERNMENT’ 
 
 Let W be the Lagrangian function related to the optimization problem of the 
‘super government’ defined in (4.5) – (4.7). One can then derive the following first order 
conditions for the ‘super government’ as: 
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APPENDIX E: IRS DISTRICTS AND REGIONS BY STATES  
 
STATE  DISTRICT  REGION  STATE  DISTRICT  REGION 
Alabama  Gulf Coast  Southeast  Montana  Rocky Mountain  Western  
Alaska  Pacific North West  Western  Nebraska  Midwest  Midstates  
Arizona  Southwest  Western  Nevada  Southwest  Western  
Arkansas  Arkansas-Oklahoma  Midstates  New Hampshire New England  Northeast  
 Central California   New Jersey  New Jersey  Northeast  
California Los Angeles  Western New Mexico  Southwest  Western  
 Northern California    Brooklyn   
 Southern California   New York Manhattan  Northeast 
Colorado  Rocky Mountain  Western   Upstate New York   
Connecticut  
Connecticut- 
Rhode Island  Northeast  North Carolina  North-South Carolina  Southeast  
Delaware  Delaware-Maryland  Southeast  North Dakota  North Central  Midstates  
Florida  North Florida  Southeast  Ohio  Ohio  Northeast  
 South Florida   Oklahoma  Arkansas-Oklahoma  Midstates  
Georgia  Georgia  Southeast  Oregon  Pacific North West  Western  
Hawaii  Pacific North West  Western  Pennsylvania  Pennsylvania  Northeast  
Idaho  Rocky Mountain  Western  Rhode Island  
Connecticut- 
Rhode Island  Northeast  
Illinois  Illinois  Midstates  South Carolina  North-South Carolina  Southeast  
Indiana  Indiana  Southeast  South Dakota  North Central  Midstates  
Iowa  Midwest  Midstates  Tennessee  Kentucky-Tennessee  Southeast  
Kansas  Kansas-Missouri  Midstates  Texas  North Texas  Midstates  
Kentucky  Kentucky-Tennessee  Southeast   South Texas   
Louisiana  Gulf Coast  Southeast  Utah  Rocky Mountain  Western  
Maine  New England  Northeast  Vermont  New England  Northeast  
Maryland  Delaware-Maryland  Southeast  Virginia  Virginia-West Virginia  Southeast  
Massachusetts  New England  Northeast  Washington  Pacific North West  Western  
Michigan  Michigan  Northeast  West Virginia  Virginia-West Virginia  Southeast  
Minnesota  North Central  Midstates  Wisconsin  Midwest  Midstates  
Mississippi  Gulf Coast  Southeast  Wyoming  Rocky Mountain  Western  
Source: The Internal Revenue Service
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APPENDIX F: CORRELATION MATRIX OF THE VARIABLES 
 
 A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O 
A 1.00               
B -0.23 1.00              
C -0.19 0.29 1.00             
D 0.31 -0.02 0.05 1.00            
E -0.24 0.11 0.23 0.11 1.00           
F 0.17 0.05 0.52 0.35 0.13 1.00          
G -0.22 0.19 0.34 -0.54 0.29 0.15 1.00         
H -0.26 0.08 0.18 -0.54 0.08 0.07 0.74 1.00        
I -0.04 0.05 -0.24 -0.43 -0.60 -0.29 0.15 0.34 1.00       
J 0.00 -0.29 -0.25 -0.13 -0.23 -0.20 -0.18 0.02 0.24 1.00      
K 0.34 -0.03 -0.15 0.54 -0.21 0.12 -0.59 -0.53 -0.16 0.18 1.00     
L 0.00 -0.38 -0.09 0.03 -0.21 -0.23 -0.20 -0.06 0.09 0.42 0.32 1.00    
M 0.16 0.12 0.03 0.19 0.16 0.05 -0.12 -0.41 -0.37 -0.15 0.16 -0.17 1.00   
N 0.16 -0.10 -0.36 0.08 -0.08 -0.43 -0.29 -0.38 -0.01 -0.01 0.26 0.26 0.51 1.00  
O -0.01 0.13 0.16 -0.28 0.06 0.15 0.40 0.27 -0.13 -0.23 -0.23 -0.23 0.09 -0.03 1.00
Legends: A= Per return Evasion, B = Audit Rate, C= State & Federal Combined Marginal Tax Rate, 
D = Real Adjusted Gross Income, E = Percent of Returns with Wages and Salaries, 
F = Percent of Returns with Itemized Deductions, G = Number of Exemptions per Return, H = Percent of Joint Returns, 
I = Percent of Proprietors in Total Employment, J = Percent of Retail Trade in Total Employment, 
K = Percent of Service Sector in Total Employment, L = Percent of Elderly Population, 
M = Percent of Non-white Population, N = Gini Coefficient, and O = Unemployment Rate. 
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APPENDIX G: SPATIAL DIAGNOSTIC TESTS 
 
 
 There are two approaches to test for spatial error dependence based on the results 
of the within estimation. The null is expressed as H0: λ = 0 in both the approaches. One 
approach is based on the extension of Moran’s I test for spatial autocorrelation, the other 
on the Lagrange multiplier principle. However, as Kelejian and Prucha (2001) showed 
that Moran I statistic defined is not robust to misspecification. To give credence to our 
claim and to check the robustness of the Moran I, we also computed the LM statistic 
following Anselin (1988). 
 
Moran’s I Statistic 
 
 Moran’s (1950) I statistic is a well known test for spatial autocorrelation. It is a 
weighted correlation coefficient used to detect departures from spatial randomness. It is 
produced by standardizing the spatial autocovariance by the variance of the error and 
depends on a spatial structural specification such as a spatial weights matrix or a distance 
related decline function. The Moran’s I statistic is defined as 
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where N equals the number of spatial units, wij is a weight denoting the strength of the 
connection between spatial units i and j, ei is the regression residual and So is the sum of 
the weights defined as 
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The expectation of I under the null hypothesis is: 
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 The variance of I is determined normality assumption. The assumption of 
normality is useful when we have good reason to believe the errors follow a normal 
distribution. The variance of Moran I is defined as: 
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The Lagrange Multiplier Statistic 
 
The approach towards testing for spatial error dependence that is based on the language 
Multiplier principle is outlined in Anselin (1988). In formal terms, the statistic is very 
similar to the Moran’s I except for the use of a different scaling constant. Its properties 
are asymptotic. The statistic is: 
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where the notations are as above. It is asymptotically distributed as a χ2 variate with one 
degree of freedom. A high value of the statistic (and a low value of the probability) 
implies rejection of the null hypothesis of no spatial association. 
 
 
 115 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Allingham, Michael G. and Agnar Sandmo. 1972. Income tax evasion: a theoretical 
analysis. Journal of Public Economics 1, no. 3-4: 323-338. 
Alm, James R. 1999. Tax Compliance and Administration. In Handbook on Taxation, ed. 
W. Bartley Hildreth and James A. Richardson:741-768. New York: Marcel 
Dekker, Inc. 
Alm, James R., Roy W. Bahl, Jr., and Matthew N. Murray. 1990. Tax Structure and Tax 
Compliance. Review of Economics and Statistics 72, no. 4: 603-13. 
________. 1991. An Evaluation of the Structure of the Jamaican Individual Income Tax. 
In The Jamaican tax reform:87-152. Cambridge, Mass. 
Alm, James R., Gary H. McClelland, and William D. Schulze. 1999. Changing the Social 
Norm of Tax Compliance by Voting. Kyklos 52, no. 2: 141-71. 
Anderson, T. W. and Cheng Hsiao. 1982. Formulation and Estimation of Dynamic 
Models Using Panel Data. Journal of Econometrics 18, no. 1: 47-82. 
Andreoni, James, Brian Erard, and Jonathan Feinstein. 1998. Tax Compliance. Journal of 
Economic Literature 36, no. 2: 818-60. 
Anselin, Luc. 1988. Spatial Econometrics: Methods and Models. Norwell, Mass.; London 
and Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic. 
________. 2002. Under the Hood: Issues in the Specification and Interpretation of Spatial 
Regression Models. Agricultural Economics 27, no. 3: 247-67. 
Anselin, Luc and Sheri Hudak. 1992. Spatial Econometrics in Practice: A Review of 
Software Options. Regional Science and Urban Economics 22, no. 3: 509-36. 
Arellano, Manuel and Stephen Bond. 1991. Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: 
Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations. Review of 
Economic Studies 58, no. 2: 277-97. 
 
 
 
116
Arellano, Manuel and Olympia Bover. 1995. Another Look at the Instrumental Variable 
Estimation of Error-Components Models. Journal of Econometrics 68, no. 1: 29-
51. 
Atkinson, Anthony B. and Joseph E. Stiglitz. 1976. The Design of Tax Structure: Direct 
versus Indirect Taxation. Journal of Public Economics 6, no. 1-2: 55-75. 
________. 1980. Lectures on Public Economics. New York: McGraw-Hill Companies. 
Auerbach, Alan J. 1985. The Theory of Excess Burden and Optimal Taxation. In 
Handbook of Public Economics. Volume 1:61-127. New York and Oxford. 
Baltagi, Badi H. 2001. Econometric Analysis of Panel Data. Chichester and New York: 
John Wiley and Sons, Ltd. 
Beron, Kurt J., Helen V. Tauchen, and Ann D. Witte. 1988. A Structural Equation Model 
for Tax Compliance and Auditing: National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, 
NBER Working Papers: 2556. 
Blundell, Richard and Stephen Bond. 1998. Initial Conditions and Moment Restrictions 
in Dynamic Panel Data Models. Journal of Econometrics 87, no. 1: 115-43. 
Boadway, Robin, Maurice Marchand, and Pierre Pestieau. 1994. Towards a theory of the 
direct-indirect tax mix. Journal of Public Economics 55, no. 1: 71-88. 
Bound, John, David A. Jaeger, and Regina M. Baker. 1995. Problems with Instrumental 
Variables Estimation When the Correlation between the Instruments and the 
Endogenous Explanatory Variable Is Weak. Journal of the American Statistical 
Association 90, no. 430: 443-50. 
Case, Anne C., Harvey S. Rosen, and James R. Hines, Jr. 1993. Budget Spillovers and 
Fiscal Policy Interdependence: Evidence from the States. Journal of Public 
Economics 52, no. 3: 285-307. 
Clotfelter, Charles T. 1983. Tax Evasion and Tax Rates: An Analysis of Individual 
Returns. Review of Economics and Statistics 65, no. 3: 363-73. 
 
 
 
117
Cowell, Frank A. 1990. Cheating the government: The economics of evasion. Cambridge, 
Mass. and London: MIT Press. 
Cremer, Helmuth and Firouz Gahvari. 1993. Tax evasion and optimal commodity 
taxation. Journal of Public Economics 50, no. 2: 261-275. 
________. 1994. Tax Evasion, Concealment and the Optimal Linear Income Tax. 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics 96, no. 2: 219-39. 
________. 1995. Uncertainty and Optimal Taxation: In Defense of Commodity Taxes. 
Journal of Public Economics 56, no. 2: 291-310. 
________. 1996. Tax evasion and the optimum general income tax. Journal of Public 
Economics 60, no. 2: 235-249. 
Deaton, Angus. 1979. Optimally uniform commodity taxes. Economics Letters 2, no. 4: 
357-361. 
________. 1981. Optimal Taxes and the Structure of Preferences. Econometrica 49, no. 
5: 1245-60. 
Diamond, Peter A. 1975. A Many-Person Ramsey Tax Rule. Journal of Public 
Economics 4, no. 4: 335-42. 
Dixit, Avinash K. and Angar Sandmo. 1977. Some Simplified Formulae for Optimal 
Income Taxation. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 79, no. 4: 417-23. 
Dubin, Jeffrey A. 2004. Criminal Investigation Enforcement Activities and Taxpayer 
Noncompliance: California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities 
and Social Sciences, Working Papers: 1200. 
Dubin, Jeffrey A., Michael J. Graetz, and Louis L. Wilde. 1987. Are We a Nation of Tax 
Cheaters? New Econometric Evidence on Tax Compliance. American Economic 
Review 77, no. 2: 240-45. 
________. 1990. The Effect of Audit Rates on the Federal Individual Income Tax, 1977-
1986. National Tax Journal 43, no. 4: 395-409. 
 
 
 
118
Dubin, Jeffrey A. and Louis L. Wilde. 1988. An Empirical Analysis of Federal Income 
Tax Auditing and Compliance. National Tax Journal 41, no. 1: 61-74. 
Eaton, Jonathan and Harvey S. Rosen. 1980a. Labor Supply, Uncertainty, and Efficient 
Taxation. Journal of Public Economics 14, no. 3: 365-74. 
________. 1980b. Optimal Redistributive Taxation and Uncertainty. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 95, no. 2: 357-64. 
Feinstein, Jonathan S. 1991. An Econometric Analysis of Income Tax Evasion and Its 
Detection. RAND Journal of Economics 22, no. 1: 14-35. 
Hamilton, Jonathan H. 1987. Optimal Wage and Income Taxation with Wage 
Uncertainty. International Economic Review 28, no. 2: 373-88. 
Hansen, Lars Peter. 1982. Large Sample Properties of Generalized Method of Moments 
Estimators. Econometrica 50, no. 4: 1029-54. 
Hausman, Jerry A. 1978. Specification Tests in Econometrics. Econometrica 46, no. 6: 
1251-71. 
Jou, Jyh-Bang. 1992. Income Tax Evasion: Theory and Empirical Evidence from the U.S. 
State-Level Data, Tax Year 1976-1989. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of 
Chicago. 
Kamdar, Nipoli. 1995. Information Reporting and Tax Compliance: An Investigation 
Using Individual TCMP Data. Atlantic Economic Journal 23, no. 4: 278-92. 
Kaplow, Louis. 1990. Optimal Taxation with Costly Enforcement and Evasion. Journal 
of Public Economics 43, no. 2: 221-36. 
Kelejian, Harry H. and Ingmar R. Prucha. 1998. A Generalized Spatial Two-Stage Least 
Squares Procedure for Estimating a Spatial Autoregressive Model with 
Autoregressive Disturbances. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics 17, 
no. 1: 99-121. 
________. 1999. A Generalized Moments Estimator for the Autoregressive Parameter in 
a Spatial Model. International Economic Review 40, no. 2: 509-33. 
 
 
 
119
________. 2001. On the Asymptotic Distribution of the Moran I Test Statistic with 
Applications. Journal of Econometrics 104, no. 2: 219-57. 
Kolm, Serge-Christophe. 1973. A Note on Optimum Tax Evasion. Journal of Public 
Economics 2, no. 3: 265-270. 
Manski, Charles F. 1991. Nonparametric Estimation of Expectations in the Analysis of 
Discrete Choice under Uncertainty. In Nonparametric and semiparametric 
methods in econometrics and statistics: Proceedings of the Fifth International 
Symposium in Economic Theory and Econometrics:259-75. Cambridge; New 
York and Melbourne. 
Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge and Mark Rider. 2005. Multiple Modes of Tax Evasion: Theory 
and Evidence. National Tax Journal 58, no. 1: 51-76. 
McFadden, Daniel. 2006. Free Markets and Fettered Consumers. American Economic 
Review 96, no. 1: 5-29. 
Mirrlees, James A. 1971. An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation. 
Review of Economic Studies 38, no. 114: 175. 
________. 1976. Optimal Tax Theory: A Synthesis. Journal of Public Economics 6, no. 
4: 327-58. 
Moran, P.A.P. 1950. Notes on Continuous Stochastic Phenomena. Biometrika 37, no. 1/2: 
17-23. 
Plumley, Alan H. 1996. The Determinants of Individual Income Tax Compliance: 
Estimating the Impacts of Tax Policy, Enforcement, and IRS Responsiveness. 
Internal Revenue Service, Publication 1916 (Rev. 11-96). 
Poterba, James M. 1987. Tax Evasion and Capital Gains Taxation. American Economic 
Review 77, no. 2: 234-39. 
Ramsey, Frank P. 1927. A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation. Economic Journal 37, 
no. 145: 47-61. 
 
 
 
120
Sandmo, Agnar. 1981. Income tax evasion, labour supply, and the equity--efficiency 
tradeoff. Journal of Public Economics 16, no. 3: 265-288. 
Sargan, J. D. 1958. The Estimation of Economic Relationships using Instrumental 
Variables. Econometrica 26, no. 3: 393-415. 
Scholz, John T. and Dan B. Wood. 1998. Controlling the IRS: Principals, Principles, and 
Public Administration. American Journal of Political Science 42, no. 1: 141-162. 
Slemrod, Joel B. 1985. An Empirical Test for Tax Evasion. Review of Economics and 
Statistics 67, no. 2: 232-38. 
________. 1994. Fixing the Leak in Okun's Bucket: Optimal Tax Progressivity When 
Avoidance Can Be Controlled. Journal of Public Economics 55, no. 1: 41-51. 
Slemrod, Joel B. and Shlomo Yitzhaki. 2002. Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and 
Administration. In Handbook of Public Economics. Volume 3:1423-70. 
Amsterdam; London and New York: Elsevier Science, North-Holland. 
Srinivasan, T. N. 1973. Tax evasion: A model. Journal of Public Economics 2, no. 4: 
339-346. 
Stern, Nicholas H. 1987. Theory of Optimal Commodity and Income Taxation. In The 
Theory of Taxation for Developing Countries, ed. David M. Newbery and 
Nicholas H.  Stern. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Stiglitz, Joseph E. 1982. Utilitarianism and Horizontal Equity: The Case for Random 
Taxation. Journal of Public Economics 18, no. 1: 1-33. 
________. 1988. Pareto Efficient and Optimal Taxation and the New New Welfare 
Economics: National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, NBER Working Papers: 
2189. 
Tauchen, Helen V., Ann Dryden Witte, and Kurt J. Beron. 1989. Tax Compliance: An 
Investigation Using Individual TCMP Data: National Bureau of Economic 
Research, Inc, NBER Working Papers: 3078. 
 
 
 
121
Varian, Hal R. 1980. Redistributive Taxation as Social Insurance. Journal of Public 
Economics 14, no. 1: 49-68. 
Weiss, Laurence. 1976. The Desirability of Cheating Incentives and Randomness in the 
Optimal Income Tax. Journal of Political Economy 84, no. 6: 1343-52. 
Witte, Ann D. and Diane F. Woodbury. 1985. The Effect of Tax Laws and Tax 
Administration on Tax Compliance: The Case of the U.S. Individual Income Tax. 
National Tax Journal 38, no. 1: 1-13. 
Yitzhaki, Shlomo. 1974. Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis. Journal of Public 
Economics 3, no. 2: 201-202. 
 
 
 
 122 
 
 
 
VITA 
 
 Mohammad Yunus was born in 1964 in Chittagong, Bangladesh. He graduated 
from the University of Chittagong with a Bachelor of Social Science (Honors) and a 
Master of Social Science in Economics in 1987 and 1990, respectively. After graduation, 
he worked with the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies (BIDS) as a researcher. 
He undertook numerous research studies commissioned by different organizations such 
as the Asian Development Bank, the World Health Organization, the European 
Commission, the International Food Policy Research Institute and the USAID. 
 In 1996, he was awarded a British Council Scholarship for pursuing postgraduate 
study in United Kingdom. He earned his Master of Science in Industrialization, Trade 
and Economic Policy and Masters of Philosophy in Economics from the University of 
Strathclyde in 1997 and 1998, respectively. He published several papers on exchange rate 
issues in the South Asian countries in the Bangladesh Development Studies, an scholarly 
journal published by the BIDS. He received his Ph.D. in Economics from the Andrew 
Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, in 2006. 
 While pursuing his doctorate, Yunus was involved in several research projects 
with Dr. Shiferaw Gurmu and co-authored a paper with Dr. Gurmu, which was published 
in the proceedings of a conference of the International Academy of African Business and 
Development. Besides, he co-authored another paper with Dr. Zaid Bakht and Dr. Md. 
Salimullah, which was published as a discussion paper at the Institute of Developing 
Economies, Japan. He also taught undergraduate level microeconomics courses at 
Georgia State University.
 
 
 
123
 Yunus’s research interests lie in the field of public finance, particularly in the area 
of taxation, and applied econometrics and time-series analysis. Besides, his interests 
include international monetary economics. His research agenda includes an analysis of 
the corporate tax evasion and issues related to tax evasion in developing countries 
including Bangladesh, where venal tax officials are in charge of tax administration. 
 Yunus is a life member of the Bangladesh Economic Association. He can be 
reached at his current employer, Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies, Dhaka, 
Bangladesh (at http://www.bids-bd.org). 
